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Insiders, Outsiders, & Fair Access
IDENTIFYING CULPABLE INSIDER TRADING
Jonathan D. Glater†
INTRODUCTION
The federal prohibition on insider trading is adrift. This
is not to suggest that the ban is likely to vanish, as some scholars
have argued it should,1 but that the gulf between the analysis
deployed by the Supreme Court in response to allegations of this
particular misconduct, on the one hand, and both the doctrinal
rationale and the underlying intuition justifying the prohibition2
on the other, has grown rather wide. The Court does not begin
with the premise that insider trading is inherently unfair,
undermines confidence in securities markets, and therefore
should be prevented.3 Rather, the justices direct their energies—
and those of lower courts—to assessment of whether a person
with inside information violated a duty by trading on it or4
received a “personal benefit” as a result of trading by someone
† Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine. The author thanks
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Anthony J. Casey, Michael Guttentag, Joan Heminway,
Therese Maynard, Michael Perino, and A.C. Pritchard, as well as attendees at the June
2017 National Business Law Scholars Conference at the University of Utah S.J. Quinney
College of Law and at the October 2017 Annual Corporate and Securities Litigation
Conference at the University of California, Los Angeles School of Law for help refining
the ideas in this essay. In addition, the student editors of the Law Review provided
thoughtful observations and very constructive suggestions to improve the essay as they
prepared it for publication.
1 See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider
Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 861 (1983) (arguing that allowing insider trading “may
be an efficient way to compensate corporate managers”).
2 See, e.g., STEPHENM. BAINBRIDGE, INSIDER TRADING LAW AND POLICY 6 (2014)
(“Courts and regulators typically justify the prohibition on fairness or other equity grounds.”).
3 Michael Perino, The Lost History of Insider Trading, 1–3 (St. John’s Sch. of
Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, No. 18-001, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3099682 [https://perma.cc/H9Y6-5X9B] (showing that such
concerns date back more than a century).
4 It is not even clear whether this should be an “or.” It may be that improper
inside trading, according to the Supreme Court, requires a showing of both violation of
a duty and receipt of a personal benefit. Michael D. Guttentag, Selective Disclosure and
Insider Trading, 69 FLA. L. REV. 519, 543 n.125 (2017).
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else whom the insider tipped off.5 Unfairness to other market
participants does not figure in this analysis.6
The drift from an anchoring notion of fairness7 is the result
of the Court engaging in doctrinal contortions to distinguish
impermissible conduct, like exploiting personal access to
corporate information for individual gain, from affirmatively
desirable conduct, like investment research that may enhance the
efficiency of capital markets.8 Some of the cost is tangible, in the
form of failed efforts to rein in trading with illicit motives, and
some is intangible, in the form of cynicism about investing overall,
because every investor knows that on the other side of a
transaction may be a counterparty with a superior, even
unmatchable, informational advantage. The game looks rigged.9
Investing in securities markets is not just a game of
chance and insider trading may be more than cheating. The
rules that govern investor conduct do not aim solely at
preservation of fairness. To some extent this is consistent with a
pragmatic approach to capital market regulation: it is likely
impossible, and certainly would be very costly, to compensate for
all the differences across the population of investors. Some have
more experience, some have more wealth, which enables the
purchase of advice from others with more experience or with
better information.10 Given the cost of compensating for such
diversity and the dubious normative case for trying to, there is
5 Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 421 (2016).
6 Indeed, the Court explicitly rejected as overbroad the notion that all trading
on inside information must be prohibited. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235
(1980) (“We hold that a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere
possession of nonpublic market information.”).
7 There is not agreement that the insider trading prohibition has its roots in
concerns over fairness. See infra note 53. The lack of consensus even on this point
suggests that perhaps Congress must act to clarify the contours of the law—admittedly
an unlikely effort as of this writing. But there is a strong case to be made that the intuitive
notion of fairness must play a role in interpretation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
8 See Dirks v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983) (citing
importance of analysts’ pursuit of and access to material information).
9 Preet Bharara, former United States Attorney for the Southern District of
New York, has described insider trading as “rampant.” See Jason M. Breslow, Preet
Bharara: Insider Trading Is “Rampant” On Wall Street, PBS: FRONTLINE (Jan. 7, 2014),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/preet-bharara-insider-trading-is-rampant-on-
wall-street/ [https://perma.cc/6HZC-WSRE]. There is also empirical support for the claim
that insider trading has become more common. See generally Laura N. Beny & Nejat
Seyhun,Has Insider Trading BecomeMore Rampant in the United States? Evidence from
Takeovers (U. of Mich. L. Sch. Scholarship Repository, L. & Econ. Working Paper No. 50,
2012), http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/50/ [https://perma.cc/E4SM-
5UV2]. This dark view of investing is not new. See Perino, supra note 3 (describing
“[c]artoons from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries [that] frequently used
gambling imagery to represent how stock trading worked”).
10 See James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to
the “Chicago School”, 1986 DUKE L.J. 628, 628 n.3 (1986).
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a strong argument that capital market regulation should strive
for allocative efficiency. Yet this is conspicuously not the
approach taken by securities regulation. The continuing ban on
insider trading reflects a profound belief that fairness as a norm
has and should have continued relevance. This essay does not
aim to take on the question of what goal regulation of capital
markets should pursue but accepts the normative premise that
fairness matters and so addresses the distinct question of how to
determine when restrictions on insider trading have been violated.11
An analogy is instructive. In poker, equality of
opportunity across players is a fundamental presumption. If one
player deliberately obtains information about another player’s
cards with the aid of a confederate, few would question whether
that advantaged player should be penalized or ejected from the
game or both. If that same player gains the information by
careful monitoring of all the cards played in the course of the
game, however, drawing on information available to all players,
then the impropriety becomes less clear.12 If the player
inadvertently obtains such information and, knowing of its
importance and accuracy, acts upon it, the case becomes less clear
still. And if the player inadvertently obtains and acts upon such
information but is unsure of its provenance or accuracy, the case
is yet murkier. This series of fact patterns is not unlike that of
insider trading cases resolved by the Supreme Court, with an
important caveat: Players acting on information that confers an
unfair advantage in a casino take for granted that if they are caught,
they will be penalized. Thus, they not only understand that their
conduct is inappropriate, they also understand that a regulator with
broad power to punish is looking out for unfair schemes. This shared
understanding of the demands of fairness is suggestive.
This essay develops two arguments. First, the essay
contends that Justices Blackmun and Marshall were correct
11 To be yet more explicit, this essay does not seek to join the debate over the
goals of securities regulation. Whether lawmakers or the Securities and Exchange
Commission or both should try to enhance market efficiency or address information
asymmetries or pursue some other goal is beyond the scope of this project. The narrower
focus here is how to make insider trading doctrine more coherent. It may be that focusing
on the lawfulness of access to information may lend coherence to the fairness rationale
for the prohibition on insider trading, but that is not the goal.
12 Disagreement over the propriety of card counting is evident in the gambling
industry. In Nevada, casinos’ practice of throwing out payers suspected of card counting
has long survived, while in New Jersey, such exclusion of players is forbidden. I. NELSON
ROSE, GAMBLING AND THE LAW 204–5 (1986) (describing Uston v. Resorts International
Hotel, Inc., 445 A.2d 370 (1982), in which the state supreme court ruled that because the
New Jersey Casino Control Commission had the authority to set rules for participation
in games and had adopted no rule permitting exclusion of card counters, casinos had to
let them play; in Nevada, casinos’ practices are not so circumscribed).
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when they emphasized in their dissent in Chiarella v. United
States that accessibility of information should be dispositive in
the determination of whether improper insider trading has
occurred.13 In this way, this essay contends, the justices
illustrate that it is possible and indeed necessary to reserve a
place for notions of fairness in insider trading doctrine. The
essay argues for adoption of a fair access norm as a guide to
identifying wrongful insider trading. By so doing, the Court
could close the gap between lay intuitions about the
wrongfulness of trading on inside information and, perhaps,
increase faith in financial markets. This would not represent
such a tremendous doctrinal move, the essay further contends,
because it is possible at least to reconcile current doctrine with
a fair access norm and, further, to unearth a fair access norm in
jurisprudence. Indeed, doing so helps to explain puzzling kinks
in the development of doctrine.
Second, the essay suggests a way to improve fairness of
access—not the same thing as equal distribution of
information—by exploitation of the technology of modern
securities trades, which can be completed “in fractions of a
second.”14 The essay proposes that insiders be required to make
prophylactic disclosure of trades, reporting their intentions—
though not the reasons for them15—beforehand. Such disclosure
would be exploited by high-frequency traders, news of their
trades in turn would affect the price of the underlying stock at
near-light speed, and as a result the likelihood of profit by the
insider would decline. While disclosure of the substance of inside
information may pose serious problems for its possessor,
disclosure of the fact that an insider is trading does not; in fact,
such disclosure is already required.16As will be discussed further
below, however, the disclosure does not occur nearly as quickly
as it could or indeed as it must, if it is to counter the insider’s
incentive to trade in the first place. This reform does not provide
a complete solution to the problem of insider trading, to be sure,
but it both enhances doctrinal coherence and leverages how
modern markets work.
13 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 251 (1980) (“[P]ersons having
access to confidential material information that is not legally available to others
generally are prohibited . . . from engaging in schemes to exploit their structural
informational advantage . . . .”).
14 Yesha Yadav, Insider Trading and Market Structure, 63 UCLA L. REV. 968,
975 (2016).
15 This point matters because to require disclosure of the substantive
information prompting the insider to act could compel violation of fiduciary duties of
confidence to the source of the information. See infra Section II.C.
16 17 C.F.R. § 249.104 (2017).
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Versions of some of the arguments made in this essay
have been made before.17 Scholars periodically raise arguments
of fairness. This essay’s contribution lies in linking and updating
them—noting the virtue of the pre-disclosure requirement in a
market moment in which near-instantaneous reactions to news
are possible, for example. The essay also refines the notion of
“equal access,” often caricatured as requiring that information
be made available to all, with development of “fair access,” which
would not require information be affirmatively provided to all
and make price an indicator of risk tolerance only, but would
instead mandate that information be equally accessible by
lawful means.18
Both to make the subject manageable and to focus on the
institution best placed to define the scope and limits of insider
trading doctrine, the essay is directed to the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence on the application of the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s (SEC or the Commission) Rule 10b-5 in cases
involving allegations of insider trading.19 This is well-trod
17 In particular, Kim Lane Scheppele argued for a “contractarian approach to
the ethics of insider trading focuse[d] on what has happened to those who are harmed.”
Kim Lane Scheppele, “It’s Just Not Right”: The Ethics of Insider Trading, 56 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 123, 155 (1993). The critique holds yet more force today, after years of
consistent doctrinal movement away from consideration of the harm of insider trading
and toward the duties of the inside trader. See, e.g., Ian B. Lee, Fairness and Insider
Trading, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 119, 121 (2002) (attempting to “rehabilitate fairness
as a concept relevant to the debate about insider trading”); but see Jonathan R. Macey,
From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading, 13
HOFSTRA L. REV. 9, 10–11 (1984) (arguing that “notions of ‘fairness’ and ‘equity’” are
“vague and ill formed” justifications for the prohibition and that “fairness considerations
of earlier years are better analyzed in contractual terms”).
18 Indeed, this idea comes out in the writing of T.F. Woodlock, a financial
writer at the turn of the last century who approved of investors’ use of “legitimately
obtained . . . information,” and whose effort to distinguish “expert knowledge of values”
and “early information” is described by Professor Perino. Perino, supra note 3, at 21
(quoting Thomas F. Woodlock,Morality in Wall Street, MESSENGER, July 1905, at 1, 13).
19 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2017). This provision does not explicitly reference, let
alone define, insider trading; it states in its entirety:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.
Id. The force of Rule 10b-5 derives from Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, which makes it unlawful for any person
1398 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:4
ground. The discussion of high court precedents here aims both
to critique the justices’ perception that dedication to the
principle of equal access to information is unworkable and to
show that in each case, they have had to twist doctrine to ensure
a morally acceptable outcome given distinct facts. The effort is
complicated by the availability of criminal liability as well as
civil liability; the line between cases is not always clear.20 This
essay does not try to clarify the division but instead attempts to
distinguish between conduct that is culpable and conduct that is
not. For this reason, the essay does not separately address cases
involving allegations of criminal misconduct and those involving
only civil liability.
The discussion that follows has two parts. Part I outlines
the basic forms of insider trading, then traces the development
of Supreme Court doctrine, and analyzes the divergence between
initial intuition about wrongfulness and the elements of the
misconduct or crime as doctrinally defined. Part II develops the
argument for explicit adoption of a fair access norm and offers a
proposal for modification to the doctrinal framework to restore
the force of the initial intuition that the prohibition of insider
trading rests on core notions of fairness, offers a specific regulatory
reform intended to promote greater fairness, and applies the rule
to the facts of recent cases to illustrate its efficacy.
I. DOCTRINALDRIFT
Intuitively, insider trading is inherently unfair because
one side of the transaction possesses information that the other
side cannot access. Yet it does not take much analysis to find
ambiguity both on the morality of the insider’s conduct and on
the practicability of a prohibition. Some scholars have suggested
that allowing insiders to trade on the basis of the information to
which they have exclusive access enhances market efficiency, a
goal potentially in tension with market fairness.21 Recognition of
to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881, 891 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012)). In addition, SEC Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240-
14e-3, applies to trading on inside information related to a tender offer. The present
essay is limited to Rule 10b-5.
20 See SamuelW. Buell,What Is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKEL.J. 511, 517 (2011).
21 See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 1, at 858–59.
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the harm suffered by the third party transacting with the insider
is slippery, too, because the third party has the opportunity to
repurchase or re-sell instantly, avoiding any loss; not until the
insider’s information affects the market price does the third
party suffer a quantifiable injury. And it is inevitable that
different market participants will have information of varying
quality; surely not all such differences mandate regulatory
intervention. Thus, competing policy goals, conceptual
difficulties, and practical obstacles have all dogged insider
trading enforcement from the beginning.
This Part first offers what aspires to be a clean
explanation of the form of insider trading, in the abstract, in
order to put the messy facts of the cases that have reached the
Supreme Court into a clear context. The second Section provides
a concise history of the evolution of the Supreme Court’s insider
trading jurisprudence, briefly analyzing five critical cases, all of
which will be intimately familiar to scholars of this area of law.
The third Section briefly offers a critique of this evolution,
suggesting that although a majority of the Court has explicitly
sought to abandon concern with fairness, notions of fairness do
and should remain salient.
A. The Inside Trade
A visual representation of the basic forms of insider
trading helps to appreciate the evolution of the Court’s doctrine
in this area. It also helps to appreciate criticism by scholars over
the years, as the Court has reacted to permutations of the basic
elements: nonpublic information, someone with access to that
information, and a trade by that person or someone tipped off by
that person. For simplicity’s sake, assume that the person with
access to the inside information is in fact an insider, such as an
officer or director of a publicly traded corporation, and the
corporation is the owner of the information. The relationship
between this person and the corporation has doctrinal
significance.22 Then the paradigmatic inside trade looks like this:
22 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (“[L]iability is
premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence
between parties to a transaction.”).
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FIG. 1. CLASSIC.
Corporation Insider Market
information purchase or
sale
The identity of the third-party buyer or seller of the
security here does not matter; if the security is sold or bought in
a transaction on an exchange, the insider almost certainly has
no relationship with the counterparty and does not even know
who that counterparty is.23
If the insider does not trade directly but instead passes
the information to a tippee, an intermediary who sells or buys
shares of the corporation, then the transaction looks like this:
FIG. 2. TIPPEE.
Corporation Insider
information
information
Tippee Market
purchase or
sale
There may be a series of tippees, each passing the
information on to the next person, until someone in the chain
eventually engages in a purchase or sale of securities.
23 The early idea was that if the counterparty trading with an insider is a
shareholder of the company that is the insider’s employer, then the insider would be
breaching a fiduciary duty to the shareholder by trading. Because it seemed neither
sensible nor feasible to rest the prohibition on the question of whether the third-party
trader was a shareholder of the company, reliance on the rationale expanded to cover
insider transactions with anyone. Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the
Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 7–9 (1982). The
extension is vulnerable, though, to the extent that the root of wrongfulness of insider
trading is the existence of a relationship between insider and third party, such that the
former owes a duty to the latter.
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These two24 schema convey both “classic” insider trading,
which involves a trade by an insider who uses information for
personal gain; and “misappropriation” insider trading, which
involves a trade by someone who, though not an insider, enjoys
access to the nonpublic information as a result of an employment
or other legally significant relationship.25 This is appropriate;
classical cases can be recharacterized easily as misappropriation
cases.26 The second figure reflects trades by a tippee.
As these two possible, basic forms make clear, a court
reviewing the facts of alleged insider trading may focus on the
nature and implications of two or three relationships, depending
on whether the insider traded directly, as depicted in the first
diagram, or indirectly, as depicted in the second diagram. In a
direct case, there are two potentially significant relationships:
one between the corporation and the insider and the other
between the insider and the third party buying or selling on the
market. In an indirect case, there are three potentially
significant relationships: one between the principal and the
insider, as before; another between the insider and the tippee;
and a third between the tippee who trades and the counterparty
to that trade.
The analysis in the next Section illustrates how early
cases involving direct trades focused on both the relationship
between the corporation and the insider and the relationship
between the insider and the third-party outsider. Over time,
however, the Court has eschewed attention to the relationship
between the insider and the outsider and that between the
tippee and the outsider. As a result, the Court has focused on the
possibility that the insider directly, or indirectly through the
tippee, betrayed the corporation and has abandoned
consideration of fairness and the importance of faith in the
market. By classifying it as a form of agent misconduct in a
principal-agent relationship, the Court has narrowed the
definition of insider trading. But the Court has shied from
complete adoption of the language of agency, not least because
24 The theoretical justification for treating the classical theory and the
misappropriation theory as distinct is not entirely clear and as discussed below, the
Supreme Court has come to apply the same analysis of each type of fact pattern, looking
for an insider’s breach of a duty. Both a classical case and a case involving a tipper/tippee
could be recast as misappropriation cases, so the boundaries are blurry.
25 For example, an outside lawyer for the principal, who enjoys access to the
nonpublic information as a result of serving as an advisor to the client. See generallyUnited
States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (these were the basics facts at issue in O’Hagan).
26 And Zachary J. Gubler argues that misappropriation theory should supplant
the classical theory because it offers the best chance of restoring coherence and
consistency to insider trading doctrine. Zachary J. Gubler, A Unified Theory of Insider
Trading Law, 105 GEO. L.J. 1225, 1229–30 (2017).
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of the difficulty of applying agency principles to fact patterns
involving tippees many times removed from the inside source of
information. The next Section demonstrates the doctrinal
contortions the Court has engaged in to assess the conduct in
such cases involving increasingly complicated and attenuated
relationships between corporation and insider.27 The doctrinal
shift to focus on the wrongfulness of the insider’s conduct relative
to the principal makes sense, given the lack of a basis for finding
a fiduciary breach in the transaction with a third party to whom
the insider owes no duty.28 But the move still seems to miss the
forest for the trees.
B. The Path Taken
Understanding why the justices focus now on the aspects
of insider cases that they do, let alone understanding their
resolution of recent trading cases, requires an appreciation of
the evolution of the Court’s jurisprudence. This Section provides
such an overview, analyzing odd turning points in the evolution
of doctrine as the justices have tried to distinguish permissible
from improper uses of inside information. There is disagreement
among scholars over which Supreme Court cases should
constitute the canon of insider trading doctrine and the
discussion below does not pretend to be comprehensive, but does
strive to illustrate significant moves in the Court’s
jurisprudence. The proper starting point for this doctrinal
history, however, is a case that did not reach the Court but that
nonetheless provided the basic framework that courts have
accepted in insider trading cases. 29 With In re Cady, Roberts &
27 And to the extent that the Court has cited agency principles in this context,
there are clear shortcomings to its approach. Richard Epstein, Returning to Common-
Law Principles of Insider Trading After United States v. Newman, 125 YALE L.J. 1482,
1504–05 (2016).
28 William H. Painter, Inside Information: Growing Pains for the Development
of Federal Corporation Law Under Rule 10b-5, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1361, 1373 (1965) (“In
this context a concept of privity—in the sense of contractual privity—is obsolete . . . .”).
Potential recovery by the third party transacting with the insider, the issue that the
author addressed, is outside the scope of this essay, which is concerned with the
definition and recognition of the misconduct.
29 The dividing line between civil and criminal liability for insider trading is
imprecise. John C. Coffee Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil
Law Models—And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1890 n.41 (1992)
(“[T]he first case to define and proscribe insider trading was an administrative decision,
and courts have uniformly deferred to it since . . . .”). In cases involving criminal charges,
the justices cite as precedent cases that, like In re Cady, Roberts and Dirks v. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, were civil. See infra Sections I.B.1, I.B.3. In cases involving civil claims,
the justices cite as precedent criminal cases. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Zandford,
535 U.S. 813, 823 (2002) (relying on principles articulated in O’Hagan to find civil
liability). As a matter of law, the difference between civil and criminal violations lies in
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Co.,30 the SEC “built the foundation on which the modern law of
insider trading rests,” as Professor Donald C. Langevoort has
aptly put it.31 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit attempted to steer doctrine along the path set by the
Commission in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur, so the two cases are discussed together below.
1. In re Cady, Roberts & Co. (1961) and Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. (1968)
The facts of this early case are amenable to concise
summary. On the morning of November 25, 1959, a
representative of Cady, Roberts & Co. (Cady, Roberts), a
brokerage firm,32 attended a meeting of the board of a publicly
traded company, Curtiss-Wright Corporation (Curtiss-Wright).
The representative was also a director of Curtiss-Wright. During
a break in the board meeting, this director telephoned a broker
at Cady, Roberts.33 The director told the broker that Curtiss-
Wright’s board had approved payment of a lower dividend than
in prior quarters.
Before news of the dividend reduction appeared on the
Dow Jones newswire, the broker entered orders on the New York
Stock Exchange to sell Curtiss-Wright shares owned by more
than twenty client accounts.34 The sales were completed before
the price of Curtiss-Wright shares fell due to the news of the
decision by the company’s board.35 The SEC concluded that the
whether the conduct of the defendant was willful. Section 32 of the Exchange Act and
Section 24 of the Securities Act clearly state that “willful[ ] ” violations of provisions of
either law are subject to criminal sanction. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77x, 78ff(a) (2012). Professor
Samuel Buell addresses the vagueness of standards for securities fraud, but the present
essay focuses on cases involving allegations of criminal misconduct and resorts to those
involving civil claims only as necessary to illustrate critical doctrinal developments. See
Buell, supra note 20, at 520.
30 See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
31 Donald C. Langevoort, “Fine Distinctions” in the Contemporary Law of Insider
Trading, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 28, 2013), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2013/
01/28/fine-distinctions-in-the-contemporary-law-of-insider-trading/
[https://perma.cc/DH25-TU9U].
32 Cady, Roberts was registered as a brokerage pursuant to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act), which requires those who “effect[ ]
transactions in securities for the account of others” to register with the Commission.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 3(a)(4), 48 Stat. 881, 883 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (2012)) (definition of broker); id. § 15 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o) (mandatory registration for broker dealers); see also In re
Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 907 n.1.
33 In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 909.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 909–10.
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broker had violated Rule 10b-536 and upheld the proposed
penalty: a twenty-day suspension from trading and a $3,000
fine.37 Notably, the director did not leak information to the
broker as part of a “preconceived plan” and “probably
assumed . . . that the dividend action was already a matter of
public information.”38
The intuition underlying the opinion by the chairman of
the Commission, William L. Cary, is that the transaction
between the possessor of inside information, on the one hand,
and outsider investors, on the other, was unfair: Outsiders did
not and could not obtain access to information that might affect
their willingness to engage in the transaction. Cary wrote that
“insiders must disclose material facts which are known to them
by virtue of their position but which are not known to persons
with whom they deal and which, if known, would affect their
investment judgment.”39 If the insider cannot disclose, “the
alternative is to forego the transaction.”40 This obligation, now
known as the “disclose or abstain” rule, applied in cases involving
a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the
personal benefit of anyone, and . . . the inherent unfairness involved
where a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is
unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.41
The doctrinal challenge to framing the problem this way
results from the lack of any special relationship between the
insider and the outsider: In the absence of a duty created by a
legally significant relationship and in the absence of fraud, why
may the insider not exploit superior knowledge? After all, some
investors are smarter than others, or are better able to develop
insights based on publicly available information. Inevitably,
financial market participants vary in the degree of skill,
intellect, and experience that they possess. The Commission
dismissed this concern summarily, noting that it “ignores the
plight of the buying public—wholly unprotected from the misuse
36 The Commission also found that the broker, Robert M. Gintel, had violated
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, which prohibits—in language virtually
identical to that of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5—any person “to employ
any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud” in the “offer or sale of any securities.” Compare
Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, § 17(a)(1), 48 Stat. 74, 84–85 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)), with Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), and 15
C.F.R. § 10b-5 (2017); see also In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 912.
37 In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 917–18.
38 Id. at 917.
39 Id. at 911.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 912.
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of special information.”42 Thus in this foundational case, the
Commission endorsed the view that a general duty to disclose
exists, in order to protect counterparties transacting
unknowingly with insiders or parties informed by insiders. The
Commission viewed the prohibition as necessary to prevent
“abuses in the exchange markets,” or, put differently, to preserve
faith in their fairness.43
The Second Circuit acted on this understanding of the
prohibition in Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,44
a case involving insider use of information about a mining
company’s discovery of lucrative deposits in Canada.45 Sitting en
banc, a majority of the Second Circuit cited the need to maintain
the “justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace that all
investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal
access to material information”46 before finding that several of
the defendants failed to comply with the rule that they disclose
the material, inside information they possessed, or abstain from
trading.47 In adopting this position, the appellate panel made
two significant moves. First, the judges pronounced a particular
understanding of the legislative intent underlying the prohibition
on securities fraud as applied to insider trading. “It was the intent
of Congress that all members of the investing public should be
subject to identical market risks,—which market risks include, of
course the risk that one’s evaluative capacity or one’s capital
available to put at riskmay exceed another’s capacity or capital.”48
42 Id. at 913. In this way, Cary avoided grappling with the question of whether,
in the absence of a duty, the conduct of the insider constituted a “scheme or artifice to
defraud” under Rule 10b-5. Recall that fraud itself can be established if one party to a
transaction misrepresents or lies. But here, the insider did neither; the broker did not
disclose. At the same time, a party to a transaction typically is not under an obligation
to disclose every piece of potentially relevant information of which that party is aware,
as the Supreme Court later reminded. Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980).
43 In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 914 n.25.
44 Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.1968)
(en banc).
45 Id. at 840–42.
46 Id. at 848.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 852. The court went on to apply this reasoning to the specific facts of
the case:
[The defendants] alone were in a position to evaluate the probability and
magnitude of what seemed from the outset to be a major ore strike; they alone
could invest safely, secure in the expectation that the price of [Texas Gulf
Sulphur (TGS)] stock would rise substantially in the event such a major strike
should materialize, but would decline little, if at all, in the event of failure, for
the public, ignorant at the outset of the favorable probabilities would likewise
be unaware of the unproductive exploration, and the additional exploration
costs would not significantly affect TGS market prices. Such inequities based
upon unequal access to knowledge should not be shrugged off as inevitable in
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Second, the panel offered a clean, clear definition of the reason
insider trading in the case was wrongful: What was unfair was
not the disparity in possession of information but the disparity
in the ability to access it. “The insiders here were not trading on
an equal footing with the outside investors.”49
The judges recognized the harm as resulting from the
individual insiders’ use of “information intended to be available
only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of
anyone.”50 They did not address the question of how information
must be accessible in order to ensure “equal access.” Although
the Second Circuit thus endorsed an equal access theory of
insider trading, the judges did not offer a nuanced explanation
of when information is unequally available.51 For example, may
an insider exploit information legally accessible to an outsider,
but provided to the insider as a result of an official position? The
Tex. Gulf Sulphur opinion, which also emphasizes the
importance of disclosure by the insider,52 suggests that the
answer might well be no.53 But the court did not provide clear
instructions on how to distinguish information that has been
our way of life, or, in view of the congressional concern in the area, remain
uncorrected.
Id.
49 Id. at 852.
50 Id. at 848 (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961)).
51 Perhaps a distinction could be drawn between what the Second Circuit
characterized as “equal access” and what this essay argues for, fair access. The
distinction lies in the recognition of the relevance of the legal accessibility of the
information that the insider has, which in turn accepts the logic of the Supreme Court’s
later opinions focusing on the breach of a duty by the insider. See infra Section I.B.3.
52 Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 849 (“The only regulatory objective is that
access to material information be enjoyed equally, but this objective requires nothing
more than the disclosure of basic facts so that outsiders may draw upon their own
evaluative expertise in reaching their own investment decisions with knowledge equal
to that of the insiders.”).
53 This is one reason that the Second Circuit’s opinion continues to be the
subject of scholarly criticism arguing against the practical viability of an equal access
theory. Professor Bainbridge has argued that the theory “lack[s] support in the
legislative history and relevant precedents,” for example. Stephen Bainbridge, Texas
Gulf Sulphur at 50: The Unworkable Equal Access to Information Principle, STEPHEN
BAINBRIDGE’S J. OF L., RELIGION, POL., & CULTURE (Aug. 3, 2017, 10:22 AM), http://
www.professorbainbridge.com/.m/professorbainbridgecom/2017/08/texas-gulf-sulphur
-at-50-the-unworkable-equal-access-to-information-principle.html [https://perma.cc/
277A-QU7E]. An equal access principle, Professor Bainbridge warns, could make
criminal “much legitimate and, indeed, beneficial market activity,” including share
purchases by a would-be acquirer transacting because of awareness of its own acquisitive
goals, careful research by investment advisers, or the savvy, coincidental observer who
notes conduct indicative of an investment opportunity (like mining company trucks
visiting a parcel of property). Id. It is this last example, involving exploitation of access
open to anyone who looked, that distinguishes “equal access” as Professor Bainbridge
appears to define it from “fair access” as developed in this essay. The coincidental
observer has fair access because the observation is achieved without violation of law. See
infra Section II.A.
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equally accessible and information that has not—perhaps the
judges intended to develop the concept of equal access in
subsequent cases.
The Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari in
Texas Gulf Sulphur,54 but subsequently showed great discomfort
with the broad prohibition espoused by the Second Circuit.
2. Chiarella v. United States (1980)
Here, the person who traded on the basis of inside
information worked at a financial printer and from documents
prepared for printing deduced the identities of target companies
in four future takeovers and one future merger.55 Vincent
Chiarella was convicted of insider trading in violation of Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5; a panel of the Second Circuit affirmed.56 In
Chiarella v. United States, however, a majority of the Supreme
Court concluded that Chiarella’s conduct did not constitute
prohibited insider trading, even though his position afforded
him access to “material, nonpublic information,” because he was
under no obligation to disclose the information to the
counterparties with whom he traded.57 The majority concluded
that he was not an insider and so was not subject to the disclose-
or-abstain regime of Cady, Roberts.58 The majority stated that
Chiarella could not be under a duty to the “market as a whole.”59
In the absence of a duty to disclose, there could be no deception,
and without deception, there could be no fraud.60 In terms of the
second diagram above,61 there was no doctrinally significant
relationship between the corporation and the insider or between
the investor and the third-party outsider. Consequently,
Chiarella neither acted improperly nor failed to act when
required to do so.62
54 Coates v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
55 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980).
56 Id. at 225.
57 Id. at 230 (“[L]iability is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a
relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction.”).
58 Id. at 227.
59 Id. at 231.
60 Id. at 232 (citing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474–77
(1977)); see also Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 474 (“[T]he [challenged] transaction, if
carried out as alleged in the complaint, was neither deceptive nor manipulative and
therefore did not violate either § 10 (b) of the [Exchange] Act or Rule 10b-5.”). The Court’s
opinion in Chiarella and language in Santa Fe Industries suggest that a duty to disclose, if
imposed by regulation, would then move nondisclosure into the realm of the fraudulent.
61 See supra Figure 2.
62 The Court declined to consider as an alternative theory of liability the
misappropriation by Chiarella of information that belonged to the acquiring company.
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 236–37. The Court could have yet further limited the obligation
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The Court’s opinion represents a doctrinal inflection
point, revising its prior endorsement of the Commission’s
definition of insider trading. Perhaps the move could be justified
as a matter of statutory interpretation: insider trading is
securities fraud, which in turn implicates common law fraud.
Failure to disclose may constitute fraud if the silent insider
otherwise has a duty to disclose the information that would
enable a counterparty to assess a proposed transaction
properly.63 But this interpretation does not honor the language
or spirit of Cady, Roberts. The Chiarella Court’s understanding
of Cady, Roberts is selective. While the Commission addressed
the fairness of using information that a non-insider would have
no “access” to,64 the Court in Chiarella dismissed this as a broad
“parity-of-information” requirement and summarily rejected it.65
Yet fair access and parity of information are not equivalent;
equal opportunity to access information is not the same as
possession of equal information. Nor is information that is
“inaccessible” identical to information that is “nonpublic.”66
The majority opinion in Chiarella highlights the justices’
discomfort with an interpretation of the insider trading
prohibition that could deter efforts by investors to gather
by noting that insiders have the requisite relationship with shareholders of the company
through which the insider obtained information and so the insider could freely transact
with third parties who were not shareholders and to whom the insider owed no duty. The
Court rejected this path, concluding that in modern securities markets, which are
characterized by anonymity between buyers and sellers, identifying the third party and
that third party’s relationship to the insider’s employer presented insurmountable
obstacles. See id. at 232–33; see also id. at 239–45 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). In his
dissent, Justice Burger argued that the more important question is whether the person
trading on inside information violated the law in obtaining it, and that the printer
employee knowingly used the acquiror’s information to trade. Id. at 244. (This analysis
differs somewhat from that of Justice Blackmun in his dissent because Justice Blackmun
contended that the misappropriation theory was not necessary to find Chiarella
criminally liable. Id. at 245–46.)
63 See Buell, supra note 20, at 547 ( “[T]he law of securities fraud is not clear—
across all forms of its civil and criminal remedies—on the extent to which nondisclosure
and conduct alone [i.e., in absence of a duty] can support a claim of fraud.”).
64 See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961) (noting that the
obligation to disclose or abstain “rests on two principal elements; first, the existence of a
relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available
only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the
inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such information
knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing”) (footnote omitted).
65 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233. The Court returns to the question of when an
obligation to disclose or abstain arises in its discussion of Chiarella in Dirks v. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983); see also infra Section I.B.3.
66 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 241 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Indeed, as is addressed
in more detail in Dirks v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, discussed below, by defining inside
information as that which is material and nonpublic, the Court created a new challenge,
because the determination of what is material is itself potentially controversial;
determining what is legally accessible would be more straightforward. See Dirks, 463
U.S. at 655; see also infra Section I.B.3.
2018] INSIDERS, OUTSIDERS, & FAIR ACCESS 1409
information that, while not publicly announced, was lawfully
accessible. Perhaps this reflects the concern that the intent to
obtain information not generally available is not per se unlawful,
even though it could be classified as willful. Every investor
wishes to gain an advantage relative to other investors. Such
basic self-interest helps make markets work. Only sometimes,
under some circumstances, does the intent to gain an advantage
correlate with conduct that crosses a moral line. What makes the
majority’s Chiarella opinion frustrating, in a case manifesting the
concurrence of intent and action, is the additional requirement of
a breach of duty in order to identify wrongful conduct.
The counterfactual that the majority rejected is
instructive. The justices in the majority worried that to hold
Chiarella liable would be tantamount to adopting a mandatory
disclosure rule.67 Preferable in their eyes was “detailed and
sophisticated regulation that recognizes when use of market
information may not harm operation of the securities markets.”68
Themajority declined at this time to adopt the “‘misappropriation’
theory” of insider trading, which presumably would have required
a finding that Chiarella exploited information that did not belong
to him because it was property of the would-be acquirer in the
transactions described in the documents.69 The majority rejected
also consideration of the manner by which Chiarella received the
inside information and, by extension, consideration of the
fairness of his access relative to trading counterparties.70
Justices Blackmun andMarshall strongly criticized themajority’s
move and it is in their dissent, discussed in more detail below,71
that an alternative conception of the wrong of insider trading
and of the goal of its prohibition is to be found.
67 This was rejected in Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654 (“‘[A] duty to disclose under § 10b
does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information[,]’ . . . [but]
rather from the existence of a fiduciary relationship.” (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at
235)); see also infra Section I.B.3.
68 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233.
69 Id. at 236, 237 n.21. The majority reasoned that because the misappropriation
theory was not presented to the jury, it was not properly before the Court as a possible
basis for upholding Chiarella’s conviction. Id. at 236. Justice Burger’s dissent, however,
suggests that the record could be read to support an argument that the misappropriation
theory was presented to the jury, it simply was not flagged as such. Id. at 243 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) ( “The Court’s reading of the District Court’s charge is unduly restrictive.”).
70 Id. at 231. Justice Blackmun, dissenting, wanted to provide the basis for
conviction on a finding of trading on the basis of information not legally available to
others in the market. Id. at 247 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
71 Id. at 240–48 (Burger, C.J. & Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also infra note
148 and accompanying text.
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3. Dirks v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (1983)
The influence of the Court’s opinion in Dirks on the
direction of insider trading doctrine is difficult to overstate.
Dirks offered a twist on insider trading, in that the person who
was the source of the information that drove sales of shares of
the affected company apparently was not motivated by greed,
but acted to blow the whistle on corporate fraud. The justices
had to figure out how to address implications of prior decisions
that might have produced a result they did not want. The role of
motive lurks in the shadow of the Court’s analysis.
Ronald Secrist, a former employee of Equity Funding of
America (Equity Funding), a corporation that sold life insurance
and mutual funds, told Raymond Dirks, an analyst at a New
York broker-dealer, that Equity Funding had engaged in
massive fraud.72 Dirks investigated by visiting the company’s
headquarters and interviewing current and former employees.73
Senior management denied wrongdoing but other employees
corroborated Secrist’s story.74 Dirks, convinced of the truth of
Secrist’s information, tried to persuade a Wall Street Journal
reporter to write about potential fraud at the company, but the
reporter did not believe the allegations could be true.75 Dirks also
shared his findings with “clients and investors,” some of whom
sold shares of the company worth millions of dollars.76 Over the
two-week period of Dirks’s investigation, the price of the
company’s shares fell, leading the New York Stock Exchange to
suspend trading, state regulators to launch an investigation,
and the SEC to file a complaint.77 Finally, the Journal published
an article on the fraud.78
After its investigation, the SEC charged Dirks with,
among other things, violating Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
and Rule 10b-5,79 and censured Dirks. Dirks challenged the
censure in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit.80 Although he lost there, he won on appeal in
the Supreme Court.81 Writing for the majority, Justice Powell
72 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 648.
73 Id. at 649.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 649–50.
76 Id. at 649.
77 Id. at 650. The facts of the case also raise the intriguing question of how the
line is and should be drawn between civil and criminal liability for insider trading, a
subject of a future project.
78 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 650.
79 Id. at 650–51.
80 Id. at 653.
81 Id.
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defined insider trading as trading by someone acting on
“material, nonpublic information”82 either obtained as a result of
access afforded by the trader’s official position or provided by
someone in such a position who improperly disclosed in violation
of a fiduciary duty,83 meaning for the purpose of personal gain.84
Requiring a finding that the insider received a “personal
benefit” gave Justice Powell a way to distinguish the conduct of
the insiders who disclosed corporate misconduct to Dirks from
that of the paradigmatic insiders who leak to greedy and
unscrupulous traders. The justice needed to navigate a doctrinal
obstacle course, created by prior opinions, to get to the desired
outcome: no liability for Dirks or his informants. After all, under
Cady, Roberts, Dirks could well be liable, and under Chiarella,
the sources of Dirks’s information could be, too.85 Justice Powell
circumvented these challenges by finding that neither Dirks nor
his sources at the company violated a fiduciary duty in disclosing
information to investors who subsequently traded; there was no
violation because as tippers in this case, their motive was to
expose fraud and they received no personal benefit from their
disclosure.86 Dirks thus repeated the move in Chiarella to dismiss
equal opportunity of access as an unworkable goal and elevated
the “personal benefit” requirement in analysis of the propriety of
trading informed by material, nonpublic information.
From a more abstract perspective, the majority in Dirks
directed its energy to exploring the nature and implications of
the relationship between the trading individual(s) and the
company, the source of the information.87 The majority ignored
the implications of its perspective for others, who did not have
access to the information provided to and by Dirks and who
entered transactions involving shares of the company. This is
troubling, not least because the clients of Dirks that did sell their
holdings knew that they had information other investors did not
and intended to exploit their advantage. For purposes of
culpability, the question that counterparties to those sales might
82 Id. at 655.
83 Id. at 660.
84 Id. at 662.
85 This is so because in Chiarella, the Court looked for a fiduciary relationship,
and the insiders who disclosed to Dirks had both a relationship to the source of the
information and a relationship to existing shareholders of the company with whom they
might trade or might have traded. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234–35
(1980) (“[A] duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of
nonpublic market information.”).
86 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 666.
87 Professor Kenneth R. Davis characterizes this as an “[i]rrelevant
precondition[ ] to liability.” Kenneth R. Davis, The Equality Principle: How Title VII Can
Save Insider Trading Law, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 199, 201 (2017).
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want answered is, did Dirks’s clients believe that the
information they benefitted from had been obtained
improperly—that is, not just that access was exclusive but that
by operation of law, it was impossible for others?88 Elsewhere in
criminal law, this would be dispositive, establishing the
requisite mens rea concurrent with the actus reus of trading.89
Yet neither the majority nor, interestingly, the dissent,
addressed this possibility.
While scholars raised concerns over the reasoning
applied in Dirks shortly after the opinion was written,90
subsequent changes in securities regulation and in the
complexity of market transactions have added more. The
Commission’s adoption of a rule, Regulation FD, prohibiting
selective disclosure of information by an issuer of securities,
undermines the need for the Court’s respect for selective
disclosure by issuers to favored investors.91 Regulation FD
broadly prohibits this practice.92 As a result, there is no longer
need for doctrinal contortion seeking to distinguish selective
disclosures that do not constitute insider trading from selective
disclosures that do. Further, technology has dramatically eased
the broad dissemination of corporate information. No longer is it
the case, as the Court asserted in Dirks,93 that “[i]t is the nature
of this type of information, and indeed of the markets themselves,
88 Of course, from the majority’s perspective, the disclosure was not wrongful
because those doing the disclosing intended to expose fraud. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 667. So,
if Dirks’s clients understood that this was the tippers’ motivation, then the clients’
intentions could conceivably be deemed less culpable. But that is slippery reasoning,
depending as it does on the motives of the tippers to assess the conduct of the tippees.
89 See CYNTHIA LEE&ANGELA P. HARRIS, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES&MATERIALS
149 (3d ed. 2014) (“Most crimes in the United States consist of four basic elements: (1) a
voluntary act (or omission when there is a legal duty to act) that results in some kind of
social harm (in legalese, an ‘actus reus’); (2) a prohibited mental state (in legalese, a
‘mens rea,’ or guilty mind); (3) a chain of causation that links the defendant’s actions
with the social harm; and (4) concurrence between the mens rea and the actus reus.”).
90 See, e.g., Laurie Ann Black, Mark Andrew Segal, & James Carroll Stewart,
Jr., Dirks v. SEC: A Gain for Dirks, a Loss for the Market, 35 MERCER L. REV. 981, 997
(arguing that the personal-benefit test is both overbroad, capturing desirable conduct,
and underinclusive, failing to capture culpable conduct).
91 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2017). Regulation FD requires “simultaneous[ ] ” public
disclosure of information by an issuer that intends to disclose and “prompt[ ] ” public
disclosure by an issuer that inadvertently disclosed. Id. On the point about the impact
of the rule, see Guttentag, supra note 4, at 551–52 (arguing, among other things, that
Regulation FD obviates the need for the Court’s personal benefit requirement in insider
trading cases that involve disclosure by an issuer); see also Donna M. Nagy, Beyond
Dirks: Gratuitous Tipping and Insider Trading, 42 J. CORP. L. 1, 40–41 (2016) (also
arguing that Regulation FD weakened the rationale for selective disclosure endorsed by
the Court in Dirks and noting that the rule “sucked out most of the air from the very
space that Dirks created for insider-analyst communications”).
92 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100–243.103 (2017).
93 Without, incidentally, including either any discussion of feasibility or any
citation to research on the question.
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that such information cannot be made simultaneously available
to all of the corporation’s stockholders or the public generally.”94
Today, it is the nature of this type of information and of markets
themselves that such information can be made simultaneously
available to the public generally, and at near-light speed.95
How might the analysis have worked, had the Court in
Dirks focused on the relationship between the insider or tippee
acting on the insider’s information, on the one hand, and third
parties transacting with them on an exchange, on the other? The
case is still difficult, because Dirks obtained information from
prior and current employees who might well have chosen not to
speak to anyone else. Thus, Dirks may have enjoyed access that
other investors could not have, and Dirks by virtue of his
employment had time and resources to investigate that other
investors certainly did not have. But these obstacles are not of
the sort that made Dirks’s conduct per se improper; it was not
unlawful for him to investigate as he did. This distinguishes his
conduct from that of, for example, a hacker who accesses an
investment firm’s computer and obtains confidential corporate
information that confers a trading advantage.96 On the other
hand, Dirks’s clients may have been culpable, to the extent that
they believed that they received information that was not
lawfully obtainable by other investors. Note that this is not to
ask whether disclosure to Dirks violated a fiduciary duty but
whether the trading parties believed that it did.97 If equal
opportunity to access serves as touchstone, then Dirks’s conduct,
and that of the investors he advised, may not constitute
impermissible insider trading, but not because of any
relationship he or his sources had or any duty they owed to the
company, or indeed to anyone else. This perspective informs the
prescriptive portion of this essay below.98 The Court, though, by
emphasizing breach of fiduciary duty in its analysis and, as a
result, the significance of a personal benefit to the source of
inside information, left open the question of how an investor
94 Dirks v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983).
95 Yadav, supra note 14, at 971.
96 Guttentag, supra note 4, at 566–67.
97 This distinction is subtle but important. If a tippee knows that a tip includes
information not lawfully accessible to others, then transactions by that tippee are
improper. Focus on the trading party recognizes that fairness to third parties does not
turn on the actual existence of fiduciary obligations of the tipper. In insider trading
cases, the Court shows some reluctance to try to guess what is going on inside investors’
heads, but this is uncharacteristic of criminal law more generally, which often enough
requires the court to mine the intent and beliefs of a defendant to determine guilt and to
weigh possible claims of exculpatory beliefs.
98 See infra Section II.A.
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could be liable for insider trading in the absence of a fiduciary
relationship with a trading counterparty.
4. United States v. O’Hagan (1997)
In O’Hagan, the Court took up a question explicitly
avoided in Chiarella: whether the enterprising printing office
employee could have been ensnared under an alternative theory
of liability. Applying this “misappropriation” theory, the Court
found a lawyer criminally liable for trading activity informed by
information about merger targets of a client of his firm. The
justices needed an alternative to the “classical” theory because
the lawyer had no relationship with the target companies and so
his trading in securities implicated no fiduciary obligation. The
adoption of the misappropriation theory represented another
doctrinal workaround necessary because the Court had
previously ruled out consideration of the impact on third parties
of insider access to information as sufficient to support liability
in the absence of a duty.99
James Herman O’Hagan, a partner in the Minneapolis
office of Dorsey & Whitney, learned of the plans of Grand
Metropolitan PLC (Grand Met), a client of the firm, to acquire
Pillsbury Company (Pillsbury).100 In September 1988, Dorsey &
Whitney ceased representation of Grand Met about three
months after the firm’s retention, but in October, Grand Met
continued with its plans and announced its tender offer a few
weeks later.101 While his law firm still represented Grand Met,
O’Hagan bought shares and call options on shares of Pillsbury.102
After the announcement of the tender offer, O’Hagan sold his
options and stock, making a profit in excess of $4.3 million.103 A
subsequent investigation led to the filing of a fifty-seven-count
indictment against O’Hagan104 and a jury convicted him of
numerous crimes,105 including securities fraud.106
99 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980); see also supra note
57 and accompanying text.
100 United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647 (1997).
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 648.
104 Id.
105 The other charges are not relevant for purposes of this essay and the
discussion will consequently not address 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3, which O’Hagan violated
because his insider trading related to a tender offer. Id. at 676 (finding that the SEC had
authority to promulgate Rule 14e-3 and that the rule applied to the “type of
misappropriation charged against O’Hagan”).
106 Id. at 648–49.
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After O’Hagan was convicted, a three-judge federal
appellate panel reversed.107 O’Hagan had not committed
“classical” insider trading, the majority concluded, because the
underlying theory of liability did not “reach those individuals
who trade securities based on material, nonpublic information
and who owe no fiduciary duty to the shareholders of the
company whose securities are traded; these persons are the so-
called ‘outsiders.’”108 Finding O’Hagan liable under a
misappropriation theory, the panel majority continued, would
require finding deception—necessary to establish fraud—and
O’Hagan neither misrepresented nor failed to disclose when
under a duty to do so.109 The panel “reject[ed] the
misappropriation theory, in part, because it permits the
imposition of § 10(b) liability based upon the mere breach of a
fiduciary duty without a particularized showing of
misrepresentation or nondisclosure.”110
Doctrinally, the appellate panel had a defensible
interpretation of the reach of insider trading law. But
intuitively, its conclusion was deeply unsettling. In reversing
and then endorsing the misappropriation theory, the Supreme
Court thus modified doctrine to capture conduct likely to offend
a lay audience. “Under this theory, a fiduciary’s undisclosed,
self-serving use of a principal’s information to purchase or sell
securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality,
defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of that information,”
the majority wrote.111 The prohibition under the
misappropriation theory required a breach of a duty to the source
of the information, but not necessarily a duty to the third-party
purchaser or seller of securities.112 Thus the Court preserved the
critical role of fiduciary duty but expanded the scope of the insider
trading prohibition to reach instances in which that duty ran113 to
a person or entity other than shareholders of the company whose
shares the insider bought or sold.
107 United States v. O’Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 628 (8th Cir. 1996), rev’d 521 U.S.
642 (1997).
108 Id. at 616 (citing Sec. &Exch. Comm’n v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 443 (9thCir. 1990)).
109 Id. at 618.
110 Id.
111 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
112 Recall that the Court’s Chiarella decision based the finding of deceptive
conduct, and resulting liability, on the insider’s breach of the “relationship of trust and
confidence [that exists] between the shareholders of a corporation and those insiders who
have obtained confidential information by reason of their position with that corporation.”
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980). But O’Hagan occupied no position
of trust with respect to the acquisition target. O’Hagan, 92 F.3d at 647–48.
113 One possible implication is, if the owner of the information consented, the
insider would be able to exploit the inside information by trading.
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While the Court characterized the classical and
misappropriation theories of liability as “complementary,”114 it is
not difficult to classify cases of classical insider trading as cases
of misappropriation.115 After all, under either theory, the
information that would affect the price of the securities bought
or sold by the insider did not belong to that insider but was
misappropriated in violation of a duty; the source of the
information was deceived and this deception would satisfy the
definition of fraud. In this case, O’Hagan deceived the would-be
acquiror. The result of the Court’s torturous analysis is a finding
of liability consistent with a concern for fairness, but carefully
based on another rationale. There is an important implication
here: If the fiduciary breach is the root of misconduct by an
insider who trades on material, nonpublic information, then
liability should attach regardless of whether the insider profits
from the trade. There are myriad reasons why it is hard to find
such cases,116 but perhaps one is that fairness to third parties
still is a concern animating the prohibition. If the insider did not
win, then the outsider did not lose.
5. Salman v. United States (2016)
The above-described cases helped to set the stage for
Salman v. United States, which the Court heard in order to
resolve “tension” over the definition and scope of conduct covered
by the phrase “personal benefit.”117Recall that the Court inDirks
had distinguished permissible from improper disclosure of
nonpublic, potentially material information by asking “whether
the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his
disclosure.”118 If the insider received no such personal benefit,
then the insider breached no duty to shareholders.119 But the
Court did not define “personal benefit” for lower courts.
114 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
115 See, e.g., Adam C. Pritchard, United States v. O’Hagan: Agency Law and
Justice Powell’s Legacy for the Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. REV. 13, 17 (1998)
(“[T]he misappropriation theory encompasses almost all of the conduct proscribed by the
classical theory, and more.”). The Court itself later acknowledged in a footnote that the
facts of a case could be framed as either a classical or misappropriation case. See Salman
v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 425 n.2 (2016).
116 As one practical matter, such cases may be harder to detect than those in
which an investor earned notable returns. For another, what would the appropriate
monetary sanction be in such cases?
117 Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 425. Some have argued that this tension was illusory.
See Jonathan R. Macey, The Genius of the Personal Benefit Test, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE
64, 72 (2016) https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/the-genius-of-the-personal-
benefit-test/ [https://perma.cc/V7XK-YDNW].
118 Dirks v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983).
119 Id.
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In the absence of a precise definition, it was inevitable
that lower courts would adopt different interpretations, some
adopting an expansive definition of personal benefit to capture
relatively amorphous and attenuated benefits to the insider and
others adopting a narrower definition that would absolve the
insider who did not receive a tangible, quantifiable benefit. For
defendants, much rode on the definition adopted. The Second
Circuit adopted a narrow definition of “personal benefit” in a
2014 case, United States v. Newman. In Newman, a three-judge
panel reversed a pair of insider trading convictions because the
government did not establish either (1) that the tippers who
passed on inside information received a personal benefit, defined
as “an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents
at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable
nature,”120 or (2) that the tippees who traded knew that the
tipper received a personal benefit, an aspect of mens rea that the
Second Circuit panel concluded was necessary in order to
establish that the tippee knew that the tipper breached a duty
by engaging in the selective disclosure.121 The facts of the case,
the Second Circuit panel concluded, did not establish that the
tippees even knew the source of the information that conferred
on them such a lucrative trading advantage,122 let alone whether
the tippers received a personal benefit.123
A couple of years later, the Ninth Circuit endorsed a
broader definition of personal benefit in Salman. The defendant
in the case, Bassam Yacoub Salman, attempted to turnNewman
to his advantage. Salman faced criminal charges that he had
committed securities fraud by trading on material, nonpublic
information he received fromMounir Kara, who in turn obtained
120 United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014), abrogated by
Salman, 137 S. Ct. 420.
121 The Second Circuit panel addressed the mens rea question first, ruling that
the government had to prove that the tippee knew that the tipper received a personal
benefit. See id. at 449. This was one step in the panel’s reasoning: if receipt of a personal
benefit makes the disclosure by the tipper wrongful, and the tippee only inherits the
tipper’s Cady, Roberts duty if the tippee knows that the disclosure was wrongful, then
the tippee’s conduct is wrongful only if the tippee knows that the tipper received a
personal benefit. Id. But for purposes of the discussion in this essay, the critical
observation is the degree to which the attention of courts has shifted from fairness or
access to more tangential questions developed over time to sort those instances of trading
on inside information that are acceptable from those that are prohibited.
122 See id. at 442.
123 And the Second Circuit’s opinion led to an uproar. See, e.g., Ben Protess &
Matthew Goldstein, Appeals Court Deals Setback to Crackdown on Insider Trading, N.Y.
TIMES: DEALBOOK (Dec. 10, 2014, 10:19 AM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/12/10/
appeals-court-overturns-2-insider-trading-convictions/ [https://perma.cc/535A-5JRX]
(reporting that the Second Circuit decision “upended” federal prosecutors’ pursuit of
insider trading activity).
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the information from his brother, Maher Kara, an investment
banker at Citigroup.124 A jury convicted Salman on all charges.125
In his appeal , Salman cited the test articulated in Newman and
argued that the insider who was the source of the tips had not
received a personal benefit sufficiently “objective” and
“consequential” to make the disclosures wrongful.126 Salman
contended that the inside information passed along was
intended as a gift, and in any event Salman had not known of
any personal benefit to Maher Kara.127 In other words, Salman
tried to argue that the Second Circuit inNewman had concluded
that neither a mere friendship nor a family relationship were
sufficient to establish a personal benefit.128 An appellate panel of
the Ninth Circuit did not accept this argument and affirmed
Salman’s conviction.129 The panel returned to the language of
Dirks, recognizing the possibility of tippee liability “when an
insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading
relative or friend.”130
The Supreme Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit and so
reined in the Second Circuit.131 The Court’s unanimous opinion
endorsed a broader definition of personal benefit, relying on
precisely the language in Dirks contemplating the sharing of
inside information as a gift.132 In such circumstances, according
to the justices, the giving of information “is little different from
trading on the information, obtaining the profits, and doling
them out to the trading relative.”133 Because it was as if the
124 Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 423–25 (2016).
125 Id. at 425.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Salman reads
Newman to hold that evidence of a friendship or familial relationship between tipper and
tippee, standing alone, is insufficient to demonstrate that the tipper received a benefit.
In particular, he focuses on the language indicating that the exchange of information
must include ‘at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.’”
(quoting United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014))).
129 Id. at 1093–94.
130 Dirks v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983).
131 In light of the Dirks reference to trading by a relative, however, it is worth
noting that the two cases are not in great tension: Newman did not involve allegations
of trades by a relative or even friend, putting more weight on the finding of a personal
benefit that was tangible in order to establish that the tippee’s trading was wrongful.
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664; see Newman, 773 F.3d at 443–45. The rule announced in Salman
would not clearly mandate a finding of guilt on the facts of Newman.
132 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664 (“The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of
nonpublic information also exist when an insider makes a gift of confidential information
to a trading relative or friend. The tip and trade resemble trading by the insider himself
followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient.”).
133 Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 428. There is a difference, though, in that the recipient
of the given information has a choice of whether to use it; if the insider chooses to trade
on the material, nonpublic information and make a gift of the money obtained as a result,
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insider used the information personally, the conduct constituted
impermissible insider trading. This seems slippery reasoning,
because in any case involving insider trading, the insider could
have traded and made a gift of the proceeds, thereby satisfying
the personal benefit requirement; the meaning of the phrase
may grow more obscure rather than less. The Court’s
development of the personal benefit requirement was a
workaround to deal with the ostensibly good motives of the
insiders in Dirks,134 and Salman looks like a workaround to the
workaround, to make sure that the formal requirement of
personal benefit to establish culpability does not prevent
prosecution when the tippee’s motives were clearly impure.135
The relevance of a personal benefit to preserving market
integrity is far from clear. Nevertheless, the outcome in Salman,
in which the defendant was part of a deliberate, moderately
sophisticated scheme to outwit the market, is intuitively more
satisfying than that inNewman, in which the defendants similarly
benefitted from a highly organized, if diffuse and attenuated,
scheme to take advantage of access to inside information.
C. At What Cost?
Yet what, it is fair to ask, are the consequences of the
muddled state of insider trading doctrine? Judges often enough
reach decisions that rest on careful, arcane reasoning that earns
public scorn. There is the concern, cited by the SEC itself, that
the perception of widespread insider trading carried on with
impunity undermines confidence in capital markets.136 But what
then the insider is clearly culpable. But if the wrongdoing depends on the independent
action of the recipient of the information, it would seem that the tipper’s culpability is
lessened. The Court may have misconstrued a detail of the case that it cited in support
of its view of the equivalence of trading and giving cash, on the one hand, and giving
information, on the other. “In one of their tipper-tippee interactions, Michael asked
Maher for a favor, declined Maher’s offer of money, and instead requested and received
lucrative trading information,” Justice Alito wrote for the Court, but did not go on to
address why the recipient of the information actually thought that cash and information
were different. Id.
134 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663; see also supra note 85 and accompanying text.
135 Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 428 (ruling that Dirks did not require that a tipper
“must also receive something of a ‘pecuniary or similarly valuable nature’ in exchange
for a gift to family or friends” (quoting Newman, 773 F.3d at 452)).
136 See, e.g., Final Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg.
51716, 51731(Aug. 15, 2000) (codified as amended at 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 243, 249 (2017)),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2000-08-24/pdf/00-21156.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8V5-
3DR2] (justifying a rule prohibiting selective disclosure of information by issuers by
noting that the “practice of selective disclosure leads to a loss of investor confidence in
the integrity of our capital markets”).
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evidence supports the claim? The argument remains murky.137
Investors may have little choice but to rely on financial markets
as they are, which raises the question of whether investor
misgivings should matter. The population whose views may be
most relevant, those who choose not to be investors out of
concern those markets favor insiders, is difficult to survey—
assuming the results of any survey could be trusted. Professor
Langevoort noted nearly two decades back that there was (and
is) “widespread and growing willingness to invest among the
American public even though people sense that, the prohibition
notwithstanding, insider trading is still fairly commonplace.”138
He goes on to suggest that protecting investor confidence may be
a crucial myth that “derives from the more fundamental attitude
that economic power and status demand a strong dose of self-
restraint and accountability.”139
As stated at the outset, this essay does not seek to
present an argument about what the goals of securities
regulation of insider trading should be, but to assess whether
the doctrine in its current form achieves the goals asserted by
the Court.140 The above examination of cases critical to the
development of doctrine on insider trading illustrates the
meandering path the justices have taken. After initially
appearing to accept the Commission’s view in Cady, Roberts, the
Court has shifted from regarding trading on inside information
as wrong per se to viewing it as wrong only if the insider has
violated a duty. While this development has pushed doctrine
away from the intuitive wrong of insider trading, it is explicable.
If the Court were to conclude that an insider has an affirmative
duty to disclose, the justices would have to step beyond the
bounds of common law fraud. Such a duty could potentially
mandate disclosure of corporate confidences that an insider, as a
fiduciary, would at the same time have a duty to keep secret. The
next Part offers a compromise aimed at reducing the unfair
advantage of the insider while still protecting corporate confidences.
137 See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and
Practice of Insider Trading Regulation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1326 (1999) (“[T]here
has been a strong current among scholars (even among those who tend toward the pro-
regulatory side with respect to insider trading on other grounds) that the confidence
point is an illusion.” (footnote omitted)).
138 Id.
139 Id. at 1328.
140 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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II. “ . . . AND A STAR TO STEER HER BY”141
While the Supreme Court’s doctrinal treatment of insider
trading has abandoned the focus on the unfairness of permitting
one player in the great investing game to exploit information
unavailable to other players, evidence abounds that the notion
of fairness remains not only salient, but dispositive. Like a black
hole, now that the Court has rejected “parity of information”
among investors, concerns over fairness exert influence over
courts but do so invisibly.142 This Part argues that despite the
Court’s disavowal of concern for third-party, outsider investors,
their potential injury still matters. The discussion below
develops both a normative claim, that the Court should
recognize fairness explicitly to guide identification of wrongful
insider trading, and a positive claim, that in fact, notions of
fairness have covertly continued to shape jurisprudence. Lastly,
this Part develops a more nuanced explanation of the nature of
the information that uninformed third parties need in order to
invest in markets in which insiders also transact. This second
Part adopts the disclose-or-abstain framework but proposes
modification of the rule to identify precisely what an insider must
disclose and, at least as important, when the insider must disclose
it.
A. The Case for a Fair Access Norm: The Wisdom of
Justices Blackmun and Marshall
The Commission’s original conception of the
wrongfulness of insider trading, which took into account the
experience of other investors transacting in markets alongside
investors who enjoyed access to inside information, has intuitive
appeal. The SEC viewed the goal of the prohibition on insider
trading as promoting the integrity and fairness of financial
markets.143 The Commission’s conception also eliminated the
141 JOHNMASEFIELD, Sea Fever, in SALT-WATER POEMS AND BALLADS 55 (1st
ed. 1916).
142 Perhaps civil and criminal prosecution of insiders whose tips did not yield
profits is rare because such cases are perceived as causing no harm to third-party
investors on the other side of transactions with the insider. The failure to prosecute when
there is no harm to other investors suggests that the harm to the source of the
information—the fiduciary breach—is not really what matters. Of course, it also might
be that the Commission tends to pursue only claims that are easier to litigate, and cases
in which a defendant did not profit might result in a costly and difficult legal battle, with
little prospect of an eventual payoff in the form of a financial penalty.
143 See A.C. Pritchard, The SEC, Administrative Usurpation, and Insider
Trading, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 55, 58 (2016) (“The SEC would interpret the securities
laws as needed to root out information asymmetries in the secondary markets . . . .”).
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need for the Court’s doctrinal workarounds, which have created
irrelevant rabbit holes that keep lawyers busy but neither reflect
nor reliably affect investor conduct. The justification for digging
one of those rabbit holes, the importance of selective disclosure
by issuers to facilitate analysts’ role in ferreting out material
information and promoting market efficiency, is unclear, if not
nonexistent, in light of the Commission’s adoption of
Regulation FD.144
Furthermore, putting investors on a level playing field is
consistent with one of the goals of the U. S. regulatory regime,
which still seeks to facilitate investor confidence less through
substantive regulation of corporate conduct than through
mandated disclosures.145 Providing information to everyone,
equally, exploits differences in investor risk preferences rather
than differences in investor access to information. Differences in
risk preferences reflect informed choices while differences in
access to information reflect relationships over which the
investor may have little control. To be sure, investors’ ability,
like their time and resources to seek information, is not evenly
distributed across the marketplace. But there is a difference
between having the time andmoney to sit outside a corporation’s
factory and count how many widgets it churns out, and having a
personal relationship that leads the corporation’s chief financial
officer to share quarterly results a few hours ahead of the
market. As Professor Kim Lane Scheppele argued more than two
decades ago, “[t]his does not mean that all traders must have
equal information; rather, all traders should face roughly equal
search costs in locating relevant information.”146 If an investor
The Commission also regards protection of “fair” markets as a core mission today.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, What We Do, https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html
[https://perma.cc/6SQJ-9BV7].
144 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2017). Professor Guttentag develops this argument
powerfully. See Guttentag, supra note 4, at 541–45.
145 Disclosure is the fundamental regulatory goal of the reporting requirements
created by both the Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77bbbb. (2012)), which among other things mandates
disclosure of corporate characteristics prior to issuing shares to the investing public, and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) et seq. (2012)), which among other duties imposes
continuing reporting requirements on companies that have issued shares to the
investing public. Professor Donna M. Nagy provides a persuasive discussion of this
legislative history. See Nagy, supra note 91, at 6 (describing legislation targeting insider
trading in the years after Dirks and identifying repeated references to lawmakers’
concern that too many investors viewed securities markets as “rigged”).
146 Scheppele, supra note 17, at 163 (emphasis in original). But while Professor
Scheppele appears to endorse recognition of a duty to disclose when one party has
unmatchable information, ipso facto, this essay instead contends that more desirable is
a regulatory or statutory prohibition of such trades or the adoption of regulatory
mechanisms that make them unprofitable.
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lacks time, intellect, experience, or resources to obtain information,
no one is culpable in exploiting those deficits; the insider, however,
is culpable, because the insider uses information to which a
counterparty has no lawful access. The insider’s gain does not
reward time, intellect, experience, or resources.
This was the argument made in the dissent by Justices
Blackmun and Marshall in Chiarella.147 Rather than using the
common law requirement of fiduciary duty to constrain
application of the 10(b) prohibition of insider trading, the
justices argued that securities law sought to “ensure the fair and
honest functioning of impersonal national securities markets
where common-law protections have proved inadequate.”148 This
reading made clear that concern for the third party, outsider
investor should be understood as motivation for the prohibition
on insider trading. The dissenting justices did not need the
misappropriation theory to reach the conclusion that Chiarella
had violated Section 10(b). Even if Chiarella had obtained
permission from his firm or the firm’s client, in view of the
dissent the trades would have been fraudulent.149
The dissenting justices attacked the move by the
Chiarellamajority to view insider trading as an agent’s betrayal
of a principal and consequently to require a “special
relationship” in order to find a violation.150 The requirement of a
special relationship limited the flexibility and reach of Section
10(b).151 Justices Blackmun and Marshall did not object to
deploying common law principles in the context of insider
trading but to the choice of which common law principles to
incorporate. “The common law of actionable misrepresentation
long has treated the possession of ‘special facts’ as a key
ingredient in the duty to disclose,” Justice Blackmun wrote.152
Legally unobtainable information constituted a “special fact”
and recognizing it as such made the transaction “inherently
unfair.”153 An obligation to disclose based on the possession of
special facts would be consistent with the Commission’s
147 See supra Section I.B.2.
148 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 248 (1980) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
149 Id. at 246.
150 Id. at 246 n.1.
151 Id. at 251 (“I would hold that persons having access to confidential material
information that is not legally available to others generally [should be] prohibited by
Rule 10b-5 from engaging in schemes to exploit their structural informational advantage
through trading in affected securities. To hold otherwise, it seems to me, is to tolerate a
wide range of manipulative and deceitful behavior.”).
152 Id. at 247 (citing Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 431–33 (1909); 1 F. HARPER
& F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 7.14 (1956)).
153 Id. at 247–48.
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preferred approach, but more importantly, the obligation
properly would force a reviewing court to evaluate the
accessibility of the information in order to determine whether
the insider was required to disclose.154 In an important footnote,
the justices further noted the distinction between “parity of
information” derided by the majority and “parity of access,”
which would “help[ ] to ensure that advantages obtained by
honest means reap their full reward.”155
Others have argued for restoring consideration of
uninformed, outside third parties to insider trading law. For
example, shortly before the Salman decision, Professor Donna
M. Nagy made a compelling argument that both doctrinal
coherence and regulatory efficacy would be enhanced through
adoption of a theory of “fraud on contemporaneous traders.”156
Under her revised, broader, and clearer conception of insider
trading, the would-be trader seeking to transact on the basis of
material, nonpublic information improperly obtained would ipso
facto assume a duty of disclosure to third parties who might be
on the other side of a trade.157 She developed the argument based
upon Chief Justice Burger’s dissent in Dirks, in which he
asserted that the common law rule of caveat emptor should be
limited if one party to the transaction obtained an informational
advantage improperly.158 This perspective is sensible and its
attention to the plight of third-party investors would do much to
enhance jurisprudence in this area. Professor Nagy’s critique of
the reasoning of theDirksmajority helpfully highlights the manner
of access to the inside information, making central its propriety.159
Attention to the accessibility of inside information and
commitment to what this essay refers to as a norm of “fair
access” would allow a court to evaluate wrongfulness to take into
account just how an investor obtained the information and how
much effort the investor put into getting it. A scheme that is
154 See id. at 249.
155 Id. at 252 n.2.
156 Nagy, supra note 91, at 7.
157 See id. at 54 (“This ‘fraud on contemporaneous traders’ theory would turn
on whether a securities trader, with scienter, used wrongfully obtained information in a
securities transaction.”). Unlike the proposal developed in this paper, Professor Nagy’s
proposal appears to mandate disclosure of the substance of the inside information that
informed the insider’s trading. See infra Section II.C.
158 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, J., dissenting). Professor Nagy traces the
roots of the chief justice’s argument to a British case in which one side of a real estate
transaction gained an informational advantage as a result of illegal trespass on the
property. See Nagy, supra note 91, at 53.
159 To identify a model of what equitable treatment of investors might look like,
Kenneth R. Davis proposes turning to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Davis,
supra note 87, at 202. Professor Davis argues that insider trading doctrine should ensure
equality of opportunity but not equality of outcome, as Title VII aims to achieve. See id.
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more organized, more secretive, and more deliberate is more
likely to involve gathering information in ways difficult or
impossible to achieve through legitimate means. Trading
informed by lawfully inaccessible information obtained through
such a scheme would be that much more culpable. Taking effort
into account helps to overcome the problem created by highly
attenuated insider trading, when the ultimate trader might not
know the provenance of the information that informs the
decision to conduct a particular transaction. If the ultimate
trader knows or should know that the information provided is
not accessible by legal means to other investors, then that trader
should not trade.160 For a reviewing court, or even for an investor
trying to determine the propriety of a specific trade, figuring out
whether information is lawfully accessible is straightforward.
Lawfulness of access should take the place of evaluation of the
presence and extent of an insider’s duty and of the nature of any
benefit obtained if the insider is the source of a tip.
Again, gambling provides a useful analogy. The card
player who benefits from illicit signals from a confederate
observing an opponent’s cards has engaged in unfair conduct,
whether or not he is able to convert the intelligence into
winnings. This remains so whether the card player benefits from
a single confederate or a string of confederates. And this remains
so even if, at some point, a confederate in the chain of
confederates lacks knowledge of all the links making up the
overall course of conduct. The lack of privity between the
observed opponent and the confederates spying on that
opponent’s hand is utterly irrelevant to judgment of the
wrongfulness of the card player’s efforts. Whether the opponent
loses as a result of cheating is irrelevant in assessing the
wrongfulness of the conduct. The fair access norm dictates that
the proper and critical question is the accessibility of the
information conferring an advantage. A secondary question is
the degree of effort that the beneficiary of the information put
into acquiring it.
Questioning the lawfulness of access to information is
more satisfying than grappling with the nature and extent of a
160 An innocent recipient of information—that is, one who does not know of the
existence of a wrongful scheme to disseminate material, inside information—might have
a defense on these facts. Such an investor would be fundamentally passive with respect
to the information. The entrepreneurial investor who overhears and acts upon material
inside information at a track meet, for example, might not be liable. See Stephen M.
Bainbridge, The Law and Economics of Insider Trading: A Comprehensive Primer 48 (Feb.
2001) (unpublishedmanuscript) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=261277
[https://perma.cc/97M9-KZ3T] (describing SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D.
Okla. 1984)).
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fiduciary duty. Examining lawfulness does not require a
doctrinal workaround to encompass conduct by investors who
have inside information but have no duty to traders on the other
side of potential transactions. Instead, the focus is on whether
the inside information was available—and in fact obtained—by
lawful means. An investor who burgles the office of a large law
firm to learn the intended target of a takeover effort by the firm’s
corporate client has violated the law. This hypothetical
illustrates another virtue of directing the inquiry to lawfulness
of access: it disincentivizes unlawful efforts to obtain inside
information. Abandoning the search for wrongful breach of duty
evidenced by receipt of a personal benefit in favor of evaluating
lawfulness implements a simpler rule and one that properly
distinguishes between investor research that is desirable and
investor conduct that is not.
To be sure, an investor may come into possession of inside
information not through deliberate and unlawful conduct but by
happenstance. A defendant who overheard a careless executive
discussing material inside information at a restaurant might
argue that no unlawful act occurred and so subsequent trading
could not violate Rule 10b-5. Any other investor could have
accidentally overheard the same statement. So a tertiary
question would be, what was the mens rea of the investor who
overheard the inside information? If the defendant knew that
what was overheard constituted inside information and that as
a result, other investors would not be able to match the
defendant’s information advantage, then the defendant properly
could be liable despite the lack of effort to obtain the
information. As a practical matter, regulators may not detect
and may not pursue such cases because of the difficulty of
identifying the moment of inadvertent disclosure and tying it to
the overhearing investor’s trading; without information on how
often the SEC detects suspicious trading activity but does not
sue the potentially offending investors, it is difficult even to
speculate on this.
B. Unearthing a Fair Access Norm in Supreme Court
Doctrine
Arguing for adoption of a fairness norm is straightforward,
given its alignment with intuitions about the nature of the wrong
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that the insider commits.161 But it is also possible to argue that
an implicit norm of fair access explains the complex path that
insider trading doctrine has taken. That is, the different
outcomes in cases in which the relevant conduct is doctrinally
similar may reflect efforts to comport with notions of fairness to
third-party investors under the constraints created by prior
decisions.
Consider once again Newman and Salman. There is a
persuasive argument that the Second Circuit panel was correct
in its reading of Dirks,162 as Professor A.C. Pritchard explained
in an article published before the Supreme Court decided
Salman.163 Based on his analysis of Justice Powell’s papers,
Professor Pritchard illustrated how the justice struggled with
the question of scienter: what someone trading on material,
nonpublic information had to intend, in order to be culpable.164
Justice Powell’s default assumption was that some trading on
such information was permissible, even desirable, and so had to
be distinguished from trading that was unlawful.165 Because
unearthing evidence of intent of the insider might often be
difficult, Justice O’Connor persuaded Justice Powell to adopt a
more objective test. The opinion that Powell ultimately wrote
offered a test that turned on whether the tipper received a
material benefit as a result of providing the information.166 This
was not, Professor Pritchard notes, abandonment of the search
for purpose, but a narrowing of the field of possible purposes that
rendered the tipper culpable.167 To the extent that the insider did
receive a benefit, wrongful intent could be safely presumed.
Newman presented an unresolved question: what exactly
did a tippee have to know to satisfy the requirements of Rule
10b-5 liability for insider trading? The defendants argued that
the government had to prove not only that they knew that the
161 See, e.g., Scheppele, supra note 17 (noting the gap between arguments about
the morality of insider trading and “hard-edged arguments about specific fiduciary
duties, general economic efficiency, and property rights in information”).
162 Several other thoughtful and prominent legal scholars submitted an amicus
brief in the Newman case, arguing in favor of the interpretation of Dirks that the Second
Circuit ended up adopting. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Law Professors Stephen
Bainbridge, M. Todd Henderson, and Jonathan Macey in Opposition to the United States
of America’s Petition for Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, United States v. Newman,
773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014) (No. 13-1837-cr(L)), 2015 WL 1064409.
163 See A.C. Pritchard, Dirks and the Genesis of Personal Benefit, 68 SMU L.
REV. 857, 861 (2015). It is worth noting that Professor Pritchard’s assessment of the
fidelity of the Second Circuit to Dirks in Newman did not conclusively assess the wisdom
of the Dirks holding per se.
164 See id.
165 See id.
166 See id. at 866.
167 See id. at 867.
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inside information they received had been disclosed in violation
of a duty, but also that they knew that the source of the
information received a personal benefit.168 This view, adopted by
the Second Circuit, was “more faithful to Powell’s understanding
of the personal benefit test and the requirement that the tippee
be a participant in the insider’s fraudulent breach of fiduciary
duty,” Professor Pritchard wrote.169 And given the origin of the
“personal benefit” requirement as a means of establishing
wrongful intent, it is hard to disagree with Professor Pritchard’s
assessment. The Second Circuit went further in defining
“personal benefit” in so concrete and tangible a fashion170 as to
preclude prosecution in many cases involving selective
disclosure of material, nonpublic information to tippees who
used the information to their advantage. While Professor
Pritchard characterized the question of whether the Second
Circuit’s narrower definition of personal benefit was faithful to
Dirks as a “close one,” he concluded that the answer was yes.171
Given the importance Justice Powell attached to finding culpable
intent before imposing liability, it makes sense to interpret the
personal benefit test to limit the reach of enforcement.172
Yet in Salman, the justices rejected the personal benefit
test of Newman. While the reasoning of the high court was
analyzed previously,173 this essay’s analysis so far has not
attempted to answer the deeper question of why the justices in
Salman interpreted Dirks as they did.174 Doctrine did not
mandate upholding Salman’s conviction—the facts could be
analogized to those of Chiarella—but honoring a notion of
fairness to third parties certainly did. The defendant in Salman
deliberately obtained an informational advantage, one that
other investors could not legally match, and used it.175 Had the
justices determined that Salman received no “personal benefit”
from trading activity informed by insider disclosures, then he
168 United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 444 (2d Cir. 2014).
169 Pritchard, supra note 163, at 873.
170 According to the appellate panel, establishing receipt of a personal benefit
required “proof of a meaningfully close personal relationship that generates an exchange
that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary
or similarly valuable nature.” Newman, 773 F.3d at 452.
171 Pritchard, supra note 163, at 873–74.
172 As Professor Pritchard puts it, the goal of the majority inDirks was to “fence
the [SEC] in.” Id. at 874. Too broad a definition of personal benefit might have given the
agency too much leeway to concoct “novel theories.” Id.
173 See supra Section I.B.
174 Or, put another way: when Professor Pritchard makes an argument about
the proper understanding of insider trading enforcement, this author, at least, finds it
wise to listen with considerable care.
175 See Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 424 (2016) (describing how
information got to Salman).
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would have gone unpunished. That they did not take that path
may indicate that, just maybe, a nagging notion of fairness
played a role in their decision not to let Salman off the hook.
Working backward through the cases that shaped doctrine,
it is easy to argue that the theory of wrongdoing underlying
misappropriation cases like O’Hagan is consistent with a fair
access norm. But if a fair access standard were applied, a finding
of liability would result not from any wrong to the owner of the
information that was misappropriated but from the unfairness
created by the legal inability of third-party investors to match the
informational advantage.
The same kind of analysis yields a different outcome in
Chiarella. There, the defendant exploited access that another
investor could not legally duplicate.176 The proper result would
be insider trading liability for Chiarella but not because of a
breach of law or duty. Recognition of a fair access norm would
not on every set of facts lead to the same conclusion that the
Court has reached, though it would grant some coherence to
doctrine. The norm would also help to shape investor
expectations about what kind of investigative conduct is
permissible and what will draw the attention of regulators and,
potentially, prosecutors.177
Lastly, unearthing a fair access norm in Dirks presents
little analytic difficulty and may easily lead to the same outcome
that the Court did reach, but for different and analytically
cleaner reasons. The question becomes not whether Dirks, the
analyst, breached a duty, or whether the source of Dirks’s
information breached a duty. Rather, the question iswhether the
information that Dirks obtained could have been accessed
lawfully by a third party, such that Dirks’s use of the
information was fair. And whether the information was
accessible must turn not on the cost or difficulty of obtaining
access, or even on hypothetical questions about whether the
corporate officials who provided the information would have
been as forthright with anyone other than Dirks. Accessible
information is that which anyone with the time and resources
can obtain without violating the law.
To analyze the accessibility of the information Dirks
received requires considering whether the corporate officials
who spoke with him broke the law or violated a fiduciary duty,
then, but for purposes of determining whether Dirks’s achieved
176 SeeChiarella v. United States, 445U.S. 222, 247 (1980) (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
177 Id. at 250 (describing the investors’ expectation of equal access and the role
of Section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 as broad anti-fraud measures).
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an unfair advantage over other investors. So, as the Dirks
majority concluded, the fact that the corporate officials who
disclosed to Dirks sought to reveal fraud and as a result violated
no law and committed no fiduciary breach178 remains meaningful
but is relevant because those facts provide an answer to the question
of access. Lawfulness of access is critical to analysis of fairness.
The next Section proposes a reform that restores
consideration of fairness. The reform is possible because of
increasing investor sophistication and the ability to use
technology to react ever more quickly to new information.
Rather than reining in these advanced traders, this path seeks
to use regulatory tools to harness their abilities and tactics to
promote fairness.
C. A Proposal to Leverage Market Sophistication
While some criticism of the Court’s insider trading
doctrine has focused on ways in which the justices have failed to
take into account both changes in regulation179 and changes in
market practices,180 less has focused on the question of whether
and how such changes could be leveraged to mitigate the
unfairness that results from possession of inside information.
This Section illustrates how a reform might be implemented,
through a relatively modest—though admittedly far-reaching—
modification of existing disclosure requirements. But before
presenting the proposal, the theoretical foundation must be laid
in order to identify with greater precision what information an
uninformed third party should receive in a fair marketplace in
which insiders also transact.
Information moves experienced investors; and those
making investment decisions at the large institutions that hold
most of the shares of publicly traded companies181 are
experienced. Mere sales or purchases of company stock, in the
absence of information or assumption or even rumor about the
basis for those transactions, should not influence investor
behavior or, consequently, market price.182 News of sales or
178 Dirks v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n., 463 U.S. 646, 666–67 (1983).
179 See, e.g., Guttentag, supra note 4, at 556–57.
180 See, e.g., Yadav, supra note 14, at 977.
181 See, e.g., StevenM. Rosenthal & Lydia S. Austin,The Dwindling Taxable Share
of U.S. Corporate Stock, 151 TAXNOTES923, 928 (2016), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/
default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/2000790-The-Dwindling-Taxable-Share-of-U.S.-
Corporate-Stock.pdf [https://perma.cc/DYX7-49AV] (finding that more than one-third of
corporate stock in the United States is held by retirement plans).
182 This is not necessarily intuitive. Were the quantity of a corporation’s
outstanding shares small enough, one might presume that purchase activity alone would
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purchases in the context of other pieces of information does and
should affect price. Consider: If a large investor liquidates its
holdings in a particular company, but it is widely known that
the seller lacks liquidity for its business operations, other
investors may well be properly skeptical that the seller has any
information suggesting that the price of the shares is about to
decline and consequently the price of the company’s shares is
unlikely to budge. On the other hand, if an investor begins
purchasing a large interest in a particular company and that
investor is known for careful research on the industry, then the
purchases may indeed signal that the investor believes that the
price of the target company’s shares is about to go up.183
Available, additional information that purports to explain investor
conduct, in both cases, gives the transaction meaning to other
investors.184
In their discussions of the “disclose or abstain”185
framework, the justices have not grappled with this distinction
between the perception that transactions alone drive prices and the
reality that information186 does, and for regulatory purposes, this
lack of precisionmatters. Critics of the disclose-or-abstain regime
have argued that the rule amounts to an unfair prohibition on
trading by insiders because disclosure of the inside information
to which they are privy would likely amount to a fiduciary
breach.187 After all, delay of disclosure often is in the interest of
drive up the price by reducing the supply, and sales would lower the price by increasing
the supply. Many investors may believe this is how prices are set. SeeWest v. Prudential
Securities, Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Sometimes full-time market watchers
can infer important news from the identity of a trader . . . or from the sheer volume of
trades . . . .”); see also infra note 184 and accompanying text.
183 For purposes of the argument here, it is not necessary that investor demand
for a particular security respond only to information and not to changes in supply of that
security. The degree of responsiveness of investor demand to different market changes
is a subject of debate beyond the scope of this discussion. It is enough, for purposes of
both the analysis and the proposal developed below, that knowledge of who is transacting
in a particular security is potentially meaningful information to other investors.
184 This distinction between the import of transactions and the import of
information about those transactions has come up before. See, e.g.,West, 282 F.3d at 938
(plaintiff clients of stockbroker who made knowingly false assertion of impending
transaction could not establish that the stockbroker’s statements caused changes in price
of shares that the clients bought). Judge Easterbrook in that case observed that
“institutional purchases (which can be large in relation to normal trading volume) do not
elevate prices, while relatively small trades by insiders can have substantial effects; the
latter trades convey information, and the former do not.” Id. at 939.
185 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
186 Or, perhaps more precisely, ideas. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE
GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 383 (1st Harvest/HBJ ed.,
Harcourt Brace, Jovanovich 1964).
187 Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in Chiarella, argued for precisely this
formulation of the disclose-or-abstain rule, to require “that a person who has
misappropriated nonpublic information has an absolute duty to disclose that information
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the corporation and its other shareholders. An impending
acquisition effort may be made more expensive if news of it
breaks too early, for example.
But in the context of insiders’ trades, the substantive
news that motivates them to act is not what uninformed, third-
party investors need to know, however much they may wish to.
It is enough to know that people with inside access are buying
or selling.188 This is the information that aids outsider investors
and moves market prices. If an insider is selling, outsiders may
well presume that this means the price of shares of the company
that employs the insider are likely to fall—not because the
number of shares sold affects the price but because the identity
of the seller suggests that the insider knows of imminent bad
news. If an insider is buying, the same analysis holds: outsiders
may well presume that the insider knows of not-yet-public good
news likely to push the price of the company’s shares up. The
status of the insider qua insider is what is meaningful to
outsider investors. The disclose-or-abstain obligation, then,
could be construed not as imposing a duty on an insider to
disclose the information to which she or he is privy, but to
disclose that she or he is an insider.
Disclosure of the status of the insider as an insider
reduces the information asymmetry between that insider and
the third-party buyer or seller. That unfairness results first from
the inability of the third party to obtain lawful access to the
information that the insider has, and second, from the inability
of the third party to learn that the insider has access to such
information. The former asymmetry cannot be corrected without
revealing what the insider knows, but the latter can. Even
though the third party does not know, and has no lawful access
to, the information that motivates the insider, if there were
preventive disclosure then the third party would know that
there is a risk that the transaction is informed by information
or to refrain from trading.” Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 240 (1980) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
188 And there is evidence that this is, in fact, what happens. One study that
sought to determine whether insider trading has become more prevalent, for example,
studied corporate share price changes in advance of public disclosure of merger activity,
and found that indeed, pre-bid price increases have grown larger. Beny & Seyhun, supra
note 9, at 39. The significant distinction is whether those price increases are the result
of insiders buying shares and somehow “driving up” the price, or whether they are the
result of other investors’ reactions to greater frequency of purchases. If outsiders
presume that the greater activity includes insiders who know something, that is
information that should affect the price. And other research has certainly found that
rumors about transactions can affect prices. The authors cite, for example, G. Jarrell &
A. Poulsen, Stock Trading Before the Announcement of Tender Offers: Insider Trading or
Market Anticipation?, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 226 (1989).
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that the third party lacks. The third party then could consider
that fact in deciding whether to proceed with the transaction.
Thus, disclosure reduces the unfairness of the trade, without the
necessity of disclosing information that might be confidential to
the corporation.
The distinction between disclosure of the substance of the
inside information and disclosure of information about the actor
using it is, in a sense, consistent with the Court’s resolution of
another case, involving early and selective disclosure of the
contents of a Wall Street Journal column known to affect
investor conduct.189 Both the trial court and the Second Circuit
applied the misappropriation theory and concluded that this was
prohibited insider trading: the contents of the column were
proprietary to the newspaper.190 The advantage to those trading
on knowledge of the column’s content did not result from their
awareness of the substance, in that whatever the column
reported might well have been publicly available information or
might have drawn on publicly available information. Rather, the
advantage resulted from advance knowledge that the newspaper
would write about that information, whether the information
was publicly available or not. The investors tipped off by the
Journal columnist were able “to buy or sell based on the probable
impact of the column on the market.”191 It was the choice of
column topic that mattered.
The requirement that an insider’s status be disclosed
would avoid the problem of the absence of a fiduciary duty owed
by the trader acting on material, nonpublic information to third
parties on the other side of the transaction. The relationships
between the company and the insider, between the tipper and
tippee, between the tippee and any third-party investors, would
not complicate the analysis. The regulatory fix helps to sidestep
the difficult knots in the Court’s doctrine. It also would
strengthen the SEC’s hand in any case alleging unlawful insider
trading, because the agency would not need to identify a
fiduciary duty and, beyond that, identify the personal benefit
received by the insider and establishing a breach. Instead, the
SEC could simply assess whether the information driving the
trading activity was lawfully accessible.192
189 See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
190 See id. at 23–24. The Supreme Court was evenly divided on the question of
whether these facts constituted securities fraud in violation of Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5. As a result of this split, the lower courts’ verdicts survived.
191 Id. at 23.
192 It is a separate question whether the SEC would further assess whether the
defendant obtained the information driving the trade in a lawful fashion. Whether
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Amodel for application of a fair access rule is easy to find.
The Commission’s Rule 14e-3 effectively does what this essay
calls for, but in a limited context. That provision defines as
insider trading transactions by any person who knowingly has
material, nonpublic information about a tender offer.193 Thus,
Rule 14e-3 squarely prohibits trading on information not
lawfully available to outsider investors. No consideration of
breach of a duty is required to find liability. The rule is a broad
and blunt prohibition, barring the specified transactions by
anyone aware of otherwise unavailable, inside information.
In many cases, perhaps most, adoption of a fair access
norm would lead to the same outcome that the Court reached
using its analysis of fiduciary obligation and potential personal
benefit. But the path to that outcome would be more direct.
Applied to Newman, for example, the first step would be
assessment of the lawful accessibility of the information that led
the tippees to trade. If the information was not lawfully
available—as the jury found in concluding that the sources of
the inside information breached a duty by sharing what they
knew194—then trading would be presumptively improper. In the
absence of a showing that the defendant tippees did not know
that (a) they had received inside information and (b) trading on
material, nonpublic information constituted prohibited insider
obtaining lawfully available information through unlawful means should still result in
liability is beyond the scope of this essay, although if the goal is to punish wrongful
intent, then the answer is clear. Perhaps such unlawful conduct is culpable, but the
subsequent purchase or sale of securities does not constitute insider trading.
193 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2017). In relevant part, the rule states:
(a) If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or has
commenced, a tender offer (the “offering person”), it shall constitute a
fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act or practice within the meaning of
section 14(e) of the Act for any other person who is in possession of material
information relating to such tender offer which information he knows or has
reason to know is nonpublic and which he knows or has reason to know has
been acquired directly or indirectly from:
(1) The offering person,
(2) The issuer of the securities sought or to be sought by such tender offer, or
(3) Any officer, director, partner or employee or any other person acting on
behalf of the offering person or such issuer,
to purchase or sell or cause to be purchased or sold any of such securities or
any securities convertible into or exchangeable for any such securities or any
option or right to obtain or to dispose of any of the foregoing securities, unless
within a reasonable time prior to any purchase or sale such information and
its source are publicly disclosed by press release or otherwise.
194 See United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 444 (2d. Cir. 2014) (stating the
jury instruction given by the judge who presided over the trial), abrogated by Salman v.
United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
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trading, they would be liable. This is not the outcome the Second
Circuit reached and perhaps is not the outcome that would have
been mandated even had Salman been decided before Newman.
But it is the outcome that tracks intuition about culpability of
the defendants.
Application of the fairness norm to the facts of Salman is
even easier because in that case it was evident that (1) the
information that motivated the defendant’s trades was not
lawfully accessible, (2) the defendant knew of the wrongfulness
of his actions, and (3) he knew that he was obtaining material
inside information. The proposed rule would thus support the
conclusion reached by each court that assessed Salman’s case.
Imposing a disclosure obligation that preserves business
confidences while allowing insiders to trade would not require
the Commission to draft a controversial new rule but to modify
an existing one, albeit in a manner that might be controversial.
Pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Exchange Act, high-level
corporate insiders and those deemed corporate insiders195
already must disclose transactions involving securities of the
companies that employ them on the Commission’s Form 4.196 As
of 2002, insiders must report changes in beneficial ownership of
securities “before the end of the second business day following
the day on which the subject transaction has been executed.”197
Prior to the adoption of that requirement, imposed in response
to a wave of corporate and accounting scandals at companies
whose names are now notorious, insiders had to disclose trades
by the tenth day of the month following the month in which the
trade occurred, permitting a lag of up to forty days.198 The law
imposes a duty to disclose and failure to disclose when required
195 For example, this includes officers and directors, but also those who hold
more than 10 percent of the company’s shares. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub.
L. No. 73-291, § 16(a), 48 Stat. 881, 896 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)
(2012)); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-3(g)(1) (2017).
196 Form 4, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form4.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7EJ8-VGHL].
197 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-3(g)(1) (2017).
198 Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Press Release 2002-22: SEC to Propose
New Corporate Disclosure Rules (Feb. 13, 2002) https://www.sec.gov/news/headlines/
corpdiscrules.htm [https://perma.cc/TEB5-Z7JR]. At least one witness testifying in
Congressional hearings on how to prevent corporate malfeasance advocated
contemporaneous disclosure of insider trades. See How to Protect Investors Against
Another Enron: Hearing on H.R. 3763 Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 107th Cong.
11 (2002) (statement of James K. Glassman, Resident Fellow, Am. Enterprise Inst.),
http://archives-financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/031302jg.pdf [https://perma.cc/9G
FW-5GFL] (“News of such [insider] sales and purchases is important information that
could signal the true state of corporate health. Investors need to know it in minutes, not
in 40 days.”).
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to do so constitutes fraud.199 Significantly, when Congress
established the two-day reporting requirement, lawmakers
expressly allowed for the possibility that the Commission might
establish a different deadline.200
The two-day reporting requirement is woefully
inadequate to the speed and sophistication of modern financial
markets. To allow other investors to respond to such disclosures
and to perform a prophylactic function, such disclosure ideally
would be mandated in advance of201 or, at a minimum,
simultaneously with, the “subject transaction.” This is the
precise, concrete proposal of this essay: If this ex ante disclosure
rule202 were adopted, information relevant to third party
investors’ decisions would be available and price would adjust in
response to the information. Indeed, high-frequency traders
could act on the news in a matter of microseconds.203 Resulting
price movement would both alert other investors to potential
material news about the company and, because the change in
price would occur so quickly, the insider would enjoy less or no
advantage from engaging in the transaction in the first place.
And both the deterrent effect and the leveling of the playing field
would be achieved without disclosure of the substantive inside
information, that is, without striving for “parity of information.”
Advance or contemporaneous disclosure that an insider
is trading would need to include an additional data point, to
enable proper evaluation by outsider investors: whether the
trade was effected pursuant to a pre-arranged plan. Rule 10b-5-
1 affords an investor an affirmative defense to a charge of insider
trading, if the transaction occurred pursuant to a prearranged
plan developed before the insider received inside information.204
199 Ronald J. Colombo, Tipping the Scales Against Insider Trading: Adopting a
Presumption of Personal Benefit to Clarify Dirks, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 117, 122 (2016).
200 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 403(a)(2)(C), 116
Stat. 745, 788 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2012)).
201 In the context of repurchase tender offers, in which a corporation offers to
buy back its own stock, one scholar has proposed that insiders must disclose the quantity
of shares they have tendered at least five days before the close of the offer period. See
Jesse M. Fried, Insider Signaling and Insider Trading with Repurchase Tender Offers,
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 421, 471 (2000).
202 It is possible that even an ex post disclosure rule would suffice to inform
markets, but this would not preclude profiteering by the insider, whose transaction by
definition would be complete before disclosure.
203 See Yadav, supra note 14, at 992.
204 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2017). To take advantage of this affirmative
defense, the transaction plan must: specify the amount of securities to be bought or sold,
the price, and the date; or provide a formula or algorithm for determining the quantity,
price, and date of the purchase or sale; or demonstrate that the insider did not “exercise
any subsequent influence over how, when, or whether to effect purchases or sales;
provided, in addition, that any other person who, pursuant to the contract, instruction,
or plan, did exercise such influence must not have been aware of the material nonpublic
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If an insider’s trade were effected as part of a prearranged plan
that satisfied the rule, that fact would affect an outsider’s
evaluation of the trade: the outside analyst would likely
conclude that the trade was not driven by the insider’s receipt of
new, material, inside information, and so need not prompt
reconsideration of a preexisting assessment of the securities
purchased or sold.205
Others have proposed accelerating the requirement that
insiders file Form 4. In 1987, a task force on reform considered
recommending adoption of a same-day reporting requirement,
an idea previously proposed in the Senate, but rejected it as
“unnecessarily burdensome” given the difficulty of submitting
the form quickly to the SEC.206 But the task force also noted that
“[i]n the future, development of the EDGAR system207 or
facsimile delivery services might eliminate present difficulties
in compliance.”208 Today, technology permits extremely rapid
transmission of the form to the Commission. Scholars have also
noted the potential impact of drastically shortening the
reporting time or requiring disclosure in advance of trading.209
But the reforms described in these proposals, made in the 1980s,
likely would have greater impact in the current environment,
given the technology-enhanced quickness of investor responses
to new information.210
information when doing so.” Id. The purchase or sale must be conducted pursuant to the
plan, and the plan must not have been entered into in an effort to evade the insider
trading prohibition. Id. Significantly, the rule does not impose a schedule on the insider
using a plan, and consequently an insider could set up a plan to execute a purchase or
sale in short order, provided that the insider did not at the time have material, inside
information. But such short-notice planning might give a whiff of impropriety. See Stuart
Gelfond & Arielle L. Katzman, A Guide to Rule 10b5-1 Plans, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP.
GOVERNANCE&FIN. REG. (Mar. 24, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/03/24/a-
guide-to-rule-10b5-1-plans/ [https://perma.cc/8R4K-EYZL].
205 The rule does not specify how far in advance a transaction must be planned;
that would also be important information that third-party outsiders would want to know
on this proposed, enhanced Form 4.
206 Comm. on Fed. Reg. of Sec., Report of the Task Force on Regulation of Insider
Trading, 42 BUS. L. 1087, 1102 (1987) [hereinafter Task Force Report].
207 EDGAR is the electronic filing system that companies use to submit forms to the
Commission. Filings & Forms, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml
[https://perma.cc/H846-SHBA]. The filings are available online free of charge. Id.
208 Task Force Report, supra note 206, at 1102.
209 See, e.g., Ellen Taylor, Teaching an Old Law New Tricks: Rethinking Section
16, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1315, 1356–57 (1997) (discussing the possibility of pre-trade
disclosure by insiders and the disincentive effect of such disclosure on insiders); Marleen
A. O’Connor, Toward a More Efficient Deterrence of Insider Trading: The Repeal of
Section 16(b), 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 309, 354–55 (1989) (noting the likelihood that
insiders would consider the effect of disclosure on outsider investor behavior before
buying or selling based on inside information).
210 It is reliance on the speediness of particular investors that distinguishes this
proposal from others; there is evidence that individual investors are “overwhelmed” by
information and so are not likely to respond to disclosure of developments relevant to
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To be effective, the SEC would need to expand the group
of potential insiders who must report transactions on Form 4, to
include all employees with access to information that could be
material to a reasonable investor—a deliberately broad class.211
Of course, an insider could attempt to circumvent the reporting
requirement imposed by Form 4 by tipping someone else off.
History well documents the possibility of indirect profiteering off
of inside information. But existing law addresses the concern: It
is “unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to do any act
or thing which it would be unlawful for such person to do under
the provisions of this chapter or any rule or regulation
thereunder through or by means of any other person.”212 Thus
while a family member of an insider might try to escape liability
on the ground that no disclosure requirement applied, the
interplay of rules would make the claim difficult. The trading by
the family member or friend would be construed as trading by
the insider, unless the source of information could establish that
she had no idea that the tippee would act on it.
As has been suggested above, tippee liability in a
doctrinal framework that explicitly recognizes a fair access norm
would have to turn on the lawfulness of access to the information
used, of course, and the mens rea of the tippee. If a tippee knew
or believed that information received was not lawfully accessible
and knew that trading on the basis of such information was
prohibited, the tippee would be culpable. At least in the criminal
context, the doctrine of willful blindness213 would apply, to
capture those who avoided investigating whether the
information received was lawfully accessible or not. This
analysis reduces the importance of retracing the path of
information along a chain of tippers and tippees, and of trying to
determine who knew what about the source and the nature of
any duty potentially breached by that source. There is an
objective question of the accessibility of the information, and a
subjective question of the awareness of the tippee. Such analysis
is not overwhelmingly difficult.
As a practical matter, the regulatory refinement
proposed in this essay would not reach every instance of insider
their investment decisions. Colleen Honigsberg, Robert J. Jackson, Jr., & Yu-Ting
ForesterWong,Mandatory Disclosure and Individual Investors: Evidence from the JOBS
Act, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 293, 303 (2015).
211 The requirement already applies to family members of the insider.
212 15 U.S.C. § 78t(b) (2012).
213 See Lee & Harris, supra note 89, at 221 (“Willful blindness requires a showing
that the defendant (1) subjectively believed there was a high probability that a fact existed,
and (2) took deliberate actions to avoid learning that fact.”).
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trading. But if high-frequency traders, who can react very
quickly to new information, can respond to these disclosures in
advance of the insider, their informed investment conduct
should affect prices. Critics of the ex post disclosure regime noted
this advantage of an ex ante requirement,214 but the likely
efficacy of such a rule is far greater today, in the era of high
speed trading. The greater the amount of time between the
required disclosure by the insider of the intention to trade and
the consummation of that trade, the more likely it is that the
price of the underlying security will have adjusted in the
interim, reducing the profitability of acting on the inside
information in the first place—though, of course, high-speed
traders will be able to profit as a result of the relatively slow
pace of price adjustment. An important benefit of this proposal
is its increasing efficacy as market players are able to move more
quickly and to react in more sophisticated ways in response to
new information. Speed can serve, rather than frustrate, a
regulatory end.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s insider trading doctrine has drifted
from concern over market integrity and correspondingly shifted
away from trying to preserve fairness. As a result, the doctrine
is no longer anchored by the principles articulated by the SEC
more than fifty years ago.215 The Court’s decisions in this area
represent a series of workarounds attempting to shoehorn
insider trading into an agency paradigm while endeavoring to
capture conduct that does not constitute a fiduciary breach but
still is egregious. This essay has argued for renewal of a
commitment to fairness, which in turn can be defined as equal
access to information. Adoption of this fair access norm would
shift the focus of the insider trading inquiry to the question of
whether the information that conferred transactional advantage
was lawfully accessible to any investor.
Beyond advocating explicit recognition of a fair access norm
in general terms, this essay offers an illustration of a possible
214 See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 209, at 1357(“[I]f market prices adjust before
insiders trade, then insiders cannot reap the benefits of their assessments of their
companies’ value . . . . If insiders must share their insights with the market by prereporting
their trades, they will have less incentive to trade.”); see also S.S. Samuelson, The Prevention
of Insider Trading: A Proposal for Revising Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
25 HARV. J.ONLEGIS. 511, 524 (1988) (proposing that insiders should be required to disclose
plans to trade 90 days ahead of time and noting that the public disclosure “would signal the
market, thereby reducing his [sic] expected profit”).
215 See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
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regulatory initiative to implement such a change in emphasis,
mandating significantly accelerated disclosure of transactions by
insiders. In advocating for more rapid disclosure of the identity of
the insider engaged in trading, the proposal seeks to leverage the
ever-increasing quickness and sophistication of financial market
players. Rather than trying to restrain technologically advantaged
trading to level the playing field, an accelerated disclosure regime
would provide a financial reward to existing innovators whose
near-instantaneous transactions could reduce or eliminate the
potential rewards to insiders seeking to enrich themselves. Such
an accelerated disclosure rule is explicitly allowed for by existing
federal legislation and would require no enlargement of the
Commission’s authority. But adoption of a fair access norm would
provide a polestar to reorient insider trading doctrine and would
help significantly in the effort to make financial markets fair to
all investors.
